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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM 
It is the task of Philosophy to answer the basic questions of 
life. What are we? why are we here? are questions basic to the life 
of every thinking person. 
2 
There is a division of Philosophy which deals specifically with 
the foregoing questions. That division is known as Metaphysics. Meta-
physics deals with the questions of being or nature, man, God, and the 
world or cosmos. Although the older philosophical divisions have been 
somewhat modified with recent investigations by the exact sciences, the 
main divisions .within Metaphysics remain the same. 
Primary metaphysical investigation deals with the question of 
ultimate reality. The metaphysical problem of man is closely related 
to the search for an adequate and coherent explanation of ultimate 
reality. Man in his relationship to himself, to nature, to God, and 
to the world has been fuel for mac;ya philosophical treatise. However, 
before these relationships can be coherently explained the question of 
man himself must be answered. Many schools of philosophy and psychology 
have attempted to answer the question of man's existence, nature, and 
social relationships. Each of these schools started with some presupposi-
tions which have influenced, if not determined, the conclusions at which 
they arrived concerning man. Therefore, to survey a philosophy of man, 
one must begin with the presuppositions, and then proceed to the conclu-
sions in the light of the presuppositions. 
II. STATEMEBT OF THE PROBLEM 
It was the problem of this study to survey some contemporary 
Idealistic and Existential philosophies of man and their ethical impli-
cations. In order to solve this problem it was necessary to investigate 
their views of the nature of ultimate reality, the nature of being, and 
the nature of man. 
III. JUSTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM 
This survey of some contemporary philosophies of man is of impor-
tance for two reasons. First, man is the subject of common concern for 
most philosophers and theologians. At the present time, there is per-
3 
haps no other subject upon which philosophers, theologians, and psycholo-
gists are so divided. It is of importance to survey some of the leading 
views of man as held by contemporary philosophers. 
The second reason for this survey of some contemporary philo-
sophies of man is that upon the basis of a view of man a system of 
ethics is usually constructed. As Emil Brunner 80 aptly put it, 
••• every political or so·cial theory, and every social or poli-
tical postulate stems t"rom a definite anthropology. Behind Liber-
alism, behind Totalitarianism, behind Communism, there is always 
a certain view ot man, each of which is the alternative to the 
Christian doctrine of man ••• 1 
lEmil Brwmer, '!he Christian Doctrine of Creation, trans. Olive 
Wyon (Philadelphia: WeStiinster Press, 1952),Il:, p. 47. 
IV. LIMITATION OF THE PROBLPM 
This study has been limited to a surv~ ot two general types ot 
c_ontemporary philosophy: Idealism and ~istentialism. . The concepts ot 
man's being, nature, and existence were ot pr:imary concern. The ethical 
implications of the concepts of man were the secondary concerns ot each 
chapter in the main body of the study. 
V. DEFDITIO!l OF lMPOR'l'ABT TERMS 
Survez. The consideration of a position as a whole in a gen-
eralized manner. A study in general terms with the purpose of obtain-
ing a broad, comprehensive view of the whole and important aspects. 
Philoso;ehz. The system of thought which interprets basic facts 
of reality and the priDCiples of human nature and conduct. Parti-
cularly in this study it had reference to a system of principles iden--
tified with a specific thinker, tendency, and school of thought. 
Idealism. The philosot>h1' which interprets all0of life in terms 
of ideas. Broadly speaking it 1s signified by a theoretical or prac-
tical view emphasizing mind, soul, or spirit as pre-eminent values and 
keys to reality. It is the alternative to Materialism. 
Existentialism. The school ot philosophy which determines the 
worth of knowledge according to its biological value contained in the 
pure data of consciousness when affected by emotions, volitions, and 
social prejudices. For the main purposes of this study Existentialism 
shall be conceived as to mean that school of' thought which emphasizes 
the existence of man as preceding his essence. 
4 
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VI. METHOD OF PROCEDURE 
This study was divided into two major types of philosophy. The 
division of each chapter was undertaken in the following manner. The 
first section of each chapter dealt with a general introduction to the 
type of philosophy. The second section of each chapter discussed the 
general principles of the philosophy, and included an expanded defini-
tion of the philosophy. The third section of each chapter discussed 
the leading exponents of the philosophy. The fourth section dealt with 
the ethical implications of the philosophy's view of man. The final 
section was a summary of the general survey completed in the chapter. 
VII. STATDIENT OF THEOLOGICAL POSITION 
This survey was initiated from a conservative Wesleyan-Arminian 
theological position. The assumptions of this position are: that God 
created, governs, and controls the present known universe; that man is 
the direct creation of God; that man as he is born into the world is in 
a state of rebellion against God; that man is spiritually dead until 
brought to life by personal faith in Jesus Christ; that the Word of God, 
the written revelation of Christ, is the objective authority for Christ-
ian living; that the Holy Spirit calls man to a new life in Christ through 
God's plan of reconciliation as revealed in the Bible; that the Holy 
Spirit initiates man's reconciliation to God and that through His work 
and ministry the believer is able to attain to full spiritual maturity; 
that the primary motive of Christian living is love for God and for one's 
fellowmen; that man is a whole being, a complex unit, composed of body, 
l 
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mind, and spirit; that these aspects of ma.n's being are indivisible, 
interacting and com.pose what is commonly known as "personality"; and 
that through personal faith in Christ man is able to become a new per-
son or become free from the power of sin to attain to his Gad-gi ven 
capabilities. 
CHAPTER II 
MAN IN IDEALISTIC PHILOSOPHY 
CHAPTER II 
MAN IN IDF.ALISTIC PHILOSOPHY 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Contemporary Idealism has its main impetus from the eighteenth 
and nineteenth century German philosophers, Immanuel Kantl and Georg 
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.2 Although these two men differed in their 
interpretations of experience, they both based their interpretations 
of experience on the empirical method. 
Since the time of Kant and Hegel, Idealism has experienced many 
changes and modifications. These modifications are embodied in the two 
general types of Idealism prevalent today. Before these two general 
types are discussed it was deemed advisable to attempt to explain the 
idealistic principle and a definition of Idealism. 
~ Principle of Idealism 
Henry Wieman and Bernard Meland gave an excellent analysis of 
8 
the Idealistic principle in their book American Philosophies .2f Religion. 
According to them Idealism has had a long and complicated history. Many 
of the co-creators and many of the diverse ideas assimilated into Ideal-
ism have made it difficult to come up with a general principle to which 
lA brief, but excellent history of Idealism is found in J. Donald 
Butler's Four Philosophies (revised edition; New York: Harper & Brothers 
Publishers, 1957), pp. 131-171. 
2Ibid. 
most idealists would subscribe. Nevertheless, in Wieman and Meland's 
opinion, there are three basic principles upon which most idealists 
would agree. 
They are: 
(1) What we know most surely and directly is mind, pre-eminently 
our ow minds; 
(2) if our knowledge of the external world is to be trustworthy, 
that world must also somehow be the manifestation of mfnd; 
(3) the good is the ultimately real while evil is not. 
Generally speaking, Idealism is a way of interpreting human 
experience and the world in terms of mind, spirit, or soul. Material-
9 
ism emphasizes matter while Idealism emphasizes mind. Idealism contends 
the mind is real and that matter is only a by-product of the mind. Ideal-
ism rejects the materialistic view that the world of sense, sight, and 
sound is basically a great machine dependent upon energy.2 
Idealism is a world view which holds reality to be constituted 
of, or closely related to mind, ideas, or selves. For the idealists 
the real is the rational and the intelligible. The world has meaning 
apart from the appearance of physical entities. An understanding of the 
meaning of physical things is through a self rather than through the ob-
jective analysis of nature. The world is interpreted by a study of the 
laws of thought and consciousness and not by means of objective science.3 
lHenry Nelson Wieman and Bernard Eugene Meland, American Philo-
sophies £!Religion (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1936), 
p. 99. . 
2Harold H. Titus, Living Issues ,!!! Philosophy (New York: American 
Book Company, 1946), p. 237. 
3Ibid. 
The entire universe has meaning for the idealist. There is an 
inner harmony between the physical world and man. As one prominent 
idealistic philosopher put it: 
What is highest in spirit is also deepest in nature. Man is at 
home in the universe and not an alien or a mere creature of chance, 
since the universe is in some sense a logical and a spiritual sys-
tem. The self is not an isolated entity; it is a genuine part of 
the world process. The process at its high levels manifes1Bitself 
as creativity, mind, and selves, or persons. Man, as f part of the 
cosmos, expresses its inner structure in his own life. 
Another aspect of idealistic thinking is that nature, or the 
objective world, is real in the sense that it exists and demands our 
2 
attention and adjustment to it. Since nature depends upon mind it 
is not sufficient in and of itself. Most idealists are willing to 
let the physical scientists determine what matter is, providing the 
scientists do not reduce everything in the world to matter. Idealists 
are willing to let the biological sciences describe life and its pro-
cesses also, providing they too do not reduce all other levels of life 
to the biological and physiological level.3 
A general principle of Idealism is its stress on the organic 
unity of the world process. For idealists the whole or parts of the 
world process cannot be separated without dangerous abstractions. 
There is an inner unity, an unfolding series of levels, from matter 
to vegetable forms, through animals to man, mind, and spirit.4 "Thus 
l..ritus, ~· ci~., p. 237. 
2Ibid~, p. 238. 
3ib1d. 
4Ibid. 
10 
a central principle of Idealism is that of' organic wholeness. 111 
Some Def'initions !2!_ Idealism 
In def'ining Absolute Idealism, R. F. A. Hernly stated; 
Absolute Idealism explores every avenue of' human experience for 
the c0ntribution it can make to a fuller knowledge of Reality. 
It regards mental activity as the process through which Reality 
discloses or reveals itself as an object of knowledge. And it 
treats worlds 'Which our minds create and sustain as the highest 
manifestations of Absolute Spirit.2 
William E. Hocking defined Idealism as "the philosophy which holds 
that reality is of' the nature of mind. 11 3 Mind for Absolute Idealism 
is the key to understanding the universe as a whole. 
Borden Parker Bowne defined his Personalism as the system which 
holds "personality as the key to reality. 114 Edgar Sheffield Brightman 
defined Personalism as the "theory that only persons are real; that all 
true being is personal."5 Albert c. Knudson defined Personalism as 
that form of idealism which gives equal recognition to both the 
pluralistic and monistic aspects of experience and which finds in 
the conscious unity, identity, and free activity of personality 
the key to the nature 06 reality and the solution of the ultimate 
problems of philosophy. 
L:ritus, ~· cit. 
2naniel Sommer Robinson (comp.), An Anthology of Recent Philo-
sophy (New York: 'Ihomas Y. Crowell Company, 1929), p.116. 
3william Ernest Hocking, 'l'ypes £!. Philosophy (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1929) 1 p. 247. · 
. . 
4wieman and Meland, .21?.• cit., p. 134. 
11 
5Edgar Sheffield Brightman, An Introduction to Philosophy (New York: 
Henry Holt and Company, 1925), p. 389. 
6Albert c. Knudson, The Philosophy ~ Personalism (New York: The 
Abingdon Press, 1927), p. 87. 
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II. TYPES OF IDEALISM 
Idealism, as an historical movement, became fragmented with 
many points of' view and many elaborate arguments caning from its 
exponents. There are many classifications of the various types of 
Idealism yet no one classification seems to be entirely satisfactory. 
For the purposes of this study Idealism was divided into two main types: 
Absolute Idealism and Personalism. Absolute Idealism's leading exponents 
in America have been Josiah Royce and William Ernest Hocking, while Per-
sonalism's leading exponents in America have been Borden Parker Bowne 
and Edgar Sheffield Brightman. 
Absolute Idealism 
Josiah Royce. Royce was born in 1855. He was perhaps one of the 
greatest philosophical minds America has produced. He spent his under-
graduate days at the University of California. John Stuart Mill and Her-
bert Spencer were an influence upon Royce in his early educational pur-
suits. Later in Germany he came under the influence of Kant, Schopenhauer 
and Lotze. His acquaintance with Hegel came in later years. Upon his 
return to America from Germany he took his doctorate at Johns Hopkins 
University in 1878. Royce then accepted the instructorship in rhetoric 
and logic at the University of California. From 1882 to 18831 while Wil-
liam James was abroad, Royce began his career at Harvard. The following 
year, 1884, G. H. Palmer took his sabbatical leave in order to keep Royce 
at Harvard another year. Royce remained there until his death in 1916.1 
lwalter G. Muelder and Laurence Sears, ~Development of Ameri-
~ Philosophy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1940), p. 234:' 
13 
In the preface of his volume The World and the Individual, Royce 
- --
stated his methodology. He accepted the empirical evidence for an inter-
pretation of reality and of the human self. He viewed the human self as 
dependent upon experience for its temporal origin, its development, its 
preservation, and for its present form of life. For Royce the various 
selves, present in experience, could possess, in the whole or in a part 
of their lives, identically the same experiences. Thus one self could 
originate or develop within another self resulting in the interweaving 
of the lives of the various selves in complex ways. Royce Justified 
his point of view by pointing out that the doctrine of multiple person-
ality was not contrary to known empirical f~cts. 1 
In explaining his theory of being Royce argued that the only 
valid basis for facts of being were those facts found within the experi-
ence of man. Yet experience is not a valid basis in all circumstances. 
For the experience of one self is not the same experience of another self 
and therefore, the experience of the two selves would produce different as 
well as similar facts. To avoid the alternative of a moment by moment 
experience as the basis for facts Royce offered the following: 
It is plain, at once, that, according to our view, every concrete 
fact in the universe becomes for us, just in so far as it is ac-
knowledge9, the expression of a purpose, and so is never a mere 
constraining power, that from without simply forces our assent. 
A fact may be acknowledged while yet many aspects of it remain 
mysterious. In so far it remains a "foreign" fact. But it is 
also our thesis that no purpose in the universe either· is, or 
can now be rationally viewed by me, as wholly foreign, to say 
my own; while facts, so far as I understand them become ipso 
1Josiah·Royce, ·The World and the Individual {New York: The Mac-
millan Company, 19o8),"pP. xii-xill.-
1 
facto expressions of ideas, and so of purposes. All purposes 
seek the expression that even now I am consciously seeking. 
Thus I myself am real, and I rigard nothing real as .! !!!. 
alienum {It is foreign to me). 
The above quotation not only expresses Royce's answer as how 
to interpret experience in the way of facts but it also gives evidence 
to the fact that he is a thorough-going empiricist. His empiricism 
becomes most obvious in such statements as 
In fact, then, our presented experience is indeed our only guide; 
but it aiways guides us by pointing beyond itself to that without 
which it becomes self-contradictory. We know of no metempirical 
truth except by means of presentations. But our presentations, 
in our present form of consciousness, get their whole sense from 
their reference to what, for us, remains metempirical truth. · No 
fact gets ·"accredited" unless our experience gives it credit. 
But experience, when rationally interpreted, in the light of our 
indirect demonstrations, never gives credit to any facts except 
to those which, in some aspect, transcend_ our presentations.2 
The use of the term "metempirical" by Royce is but his way of 
side-stepping a Naturalistic or Realistic approach to the interpreta-
tions of unexperienced data. He defined "metempirical" in the follow-
ing manner: 
This term "metempirical", which we have just used, is only a rela-
tive term. We have here employed it with express reference to the 
transcending of the narrow limits of human experience. But of 
course such transcending, so far as we get our indirectly demon-
strable right to the asser·tion that facts lie beyond these narrow 
limits, is not a transc·ending of all experience. What lies beyond 
our presentations is still, in so far as it has true Being, pre-
sentations. For the world of fact e~ists in so as it is presented 
in unity to the Absolute Experience. 
1Royce 1 .9R.· .£!!·, p. 34 • 
2 Ibid., p. 23. 
3 Ibid., p. 24. 
14 
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These presuppositions and conclusions regarding human experience 
are but reflections of Royce's basic concept of an Absolute Mind purpos-
ing and expressing itself in human experience. His ontology is necessar-
ily influenced by his interpretation of experience. An Royce said, 
"Every question about Being is also a question about the organization 
of experience, that is, about the organization ofi true final experience 
of which our own is always a fragment. 111 
Life for Royce was a search for truth and the Self beyond oneself. 
Every struggle, every tear, every misery, every failure, and re-
pentance, and every rising again, every strenuous pursuit, every 
glimpse of God's truth--all these are not mere incidents of the 
search for that which is beyond. They are all events in the life; 
they too are part of the fulfillment. In eternity all this is 
seen, and hereby--even in and through these temporal failures, I 
win, in God's presence and by virtue of His. fulfillment, the goal 
of life, which is the whole of life. What no temporal instant 
brings, what all temporal efforts fail to win, that my true Se~f 
in its eternity, and in its oneness with the divine possesses. 
Royce's conception of nature was that all nature is an expression 
of Mind. By nature Royce meant "the external to our own private experi-
ence and yet this side of ultimate Reality--a realm between the divine. 113 
Royce believed in the reality of nature as inseparably bound up with his 
belief in the existence of his fellowmen. According to him neither nature 
nor our fellowmen could be understood apart from one another. If the soc-
ial factor were taken from Royce's view of nature, a most essential charac-
teristic of possession for man, would be lost.4 "Our assurance that outer 
1Royce, loc. cito 
2Ibido1 p. 150. 
3~01 Po 158. 
4 ~01 Po 1800 
nature exists apart from any man's private experience, is thus insepar-
ably bound up with our social consciousness." 1 
16 
William Ernest Hocking. Hocking was born in 1873 and at the 
writing of this study was still living. After completing undergraduate 
work at Ames, Iowa, and graduate work at Harvard, Hocking studied in 
Germaey. He was Harvard fellow at Goettigen, Berlin, and Heidelberg. 
Aside from his deepest obligation to classical German Idealism, Hocking 
acknowledges indebtedness to Husserl, Paulsen, Dilthey, Rickert, Simmel, 
and Windelband. His philosophy of religion reflects the influence of 
William James and Josiah Royce. From 19o4 to 19o6 Hocking was instruc-
tor in history and philosophy of religion at Andover Theological Semin-
ary. He taught at the University of California from 19o6 to 19o8 and 
from 1909 to 1914 he was at Yale. Since 1914 he has been at Harvard. 2 
Although Hocking was not a prolific writer in metaphysics he has 
developed his Idealism to a point where it is discernable in much of 
his work touching religion, ethics, law, politics, and social philosophy. 
Perhaps his most outstanding single volume has been The Meaning 
£!God~~ E?Cperience. This volume reflects Hocking's general point 
o:f' view in the philosophy of religion. It also gives insight into some 
of his basic concepts of religious experience. 
When speaking of "Objective Idealism" in his !):Pes £!Philosophy, 
Hocking pointed out that "we have in our own being something like in kind 
lRoyce, 12£. _£.!!. 
2Muelder and Sears, ~ .. ~., p. 450 • 
.... 
with the activity which produces nature and presents it to us. 111 
Along the same line of thinking Hocking stated that the supreme 
mind which produces nature would differ from the human mind only in 
matter and greatness. It would seem that Bocking agrees with Royce 1n 
the concept that man is but a part of the phJ'sical expression of the 
Absolute Mind. 
In contrasting the Absolute Mind with the human mind, Hocking 
states: 
Our minds can only create after they have learned tram experi-
ence; but the world-mind must bring forth the qualities ot ex-
perience from itself, without previous patrrn; it must there-
fore be wholly active, not partly passive. 
The Absolute Slet or Mind for Hocking would be a wholq active Self, 
whereas, man is only a partially active selt--a partq passive self. 
Hocking discussed the position ot Idealism in two propositions, 
one negative and one positive: 
(a) The apparent selt-sut:ticieney of nature is illusory: nature 
appears to be independent, to go its own course, to operate its 
own laws, to be eternal, to require no creator or other ground 
outside ot itself; but in truth, nat.ure does depend on something 
else. 
(b) That upon which nature depends is Mind (Spirit, Idea). We 
adhere to the world, Idealism, taking it to sigDify simply that 
Whatever is ultimately real in the universe is such stuff as 
ideas are made of. That is, if we are looking tor the substance 
of things, the ultimate being which explains all other beings, 
we shall find. it to be mental 1n nature--the thinker and his 
thought, and will and its doings, the self and its self-expres-
sion. And whatever appears to be other than this, independent 
of it or hostile to it, as matter, or force or space and. time, 
lHocking, ~· ill•1 P• 275. 
2Ib1d. 
-
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will be found to depend on the mind for its very existence.1 
In discussing "Why Nature Exists", Hocking pointed out that God 
is often viewed as present to the human mind in consciousness; and 
that consciousness is thought of as very different from sense-experi-
ence. Hocking contended that the very obligation to objectivity which 
makes scientists and naturalists of philosophers should be the obliga-
tion which makes scientists and naturalists into philosophers. 
I point out that this instinctive, loyal deference to the element 
of objective truth in sense-experience is the perpetual token that 
the world-mind is there present to us. That which makes naturalists 
of us is the very thing which taken with more co~lete self-con-
sciousness, would make of us objective idealists. 
With the insight which Objective (Absolute) Idealism affords, the 
answer to the question regarding the purpose of nature is made possible. 
To Hocking, nature is the neutral, colorless, lifeless, stable, indiffer-
ent base upon which to build up the intricate and endless network of 
give and take, cooperation and conflict, agreement and clash of judgment 
·in society. "Nature exists in order that we may be social beings "3 was 
Hocking's opinion. In this Hocking agreed with Royce. Their emphasis 
upon the social expression of the self within nature as the expression 
of the Divine Self was the same. 
In summing up Hocking's point of view it can be said that he is in 
full agi'eement with Royce in the empirical approach to the interpretation 
of reality. The ultimate reality for Hocking is Absolute Mind. Finite 
lnocking, ~· ~., p. 248. 
2 Ibid., p. 292. 
3Ibid. 
selves are express.ions of the Absoiute. The facts of experience are 
sufficient to convince any thinking person that mind is the ultimate 
reality according to Hocking. Nature is the neutral substance upon 
which all the intricate and complicated cooperation of society is 
built.1 
Personalism 
Borden Parker Bowne. Bowne was born in 1855 at Leonardsville, 
19 
New Jersey. He attended New York University as an undergraduate. In 
1871 he began a two-year study at Halle and Goettigen, Germany. During 
this study he came under the influence of Erdman, Ulrich, and especially 
Lotze, whose philosophy was a determining influence in Bowne's Personal-
ism. After Bowne returned to the United States he followed journalism 
for a time. He was then called to Boston University in 1876 and there 
he remained until his death in 1910. Bowne was a great and influential 
teacher. His work contributed profoundly to the maturing and liberaliz-
ing of theological thought within Methodism. He gave American culture 
a host of inspired religious teachers, ministers, and administrators, a 
number of prominent contemporary philosophers, and a vigorous school of 
thought.2 
Bowne began the discussion on "The Notion of Being" in his book 
of Metaphysics by pointing out the short-comings of the theory of pure 
being. To avoid the same short-comings Bowne suggested that being be 
lsee Appendix A. for Hocking's Summary of Objective (Absolute) 
Idealism. 
~uelder and Sears, ~· ~., p. 510. 
viewed as essentially causal and active. 1 In closing his discussion 
of "The Notion of Being" he concluded "that every substantive thing, 
in distinction from both compounds~and phenomena, must be viewed as 
a definite causal agent."2 
Going on the supposition that being is action Bowne then gave 
his view of "The Nature of Things". He believed that everything is 
what it is because of its nature, and that things differ because they 
have different natures.3 There is one nature of matter and another of 
spirit. He continued his explanation by saying, "The nature of' a thing 
expresses the ~ing's real essence; and we hold that we have no true 
knowledge of the thing until we grasp its nature. 114 For Bowne "things 
exist only in their activities, and have no being apart from them."5 
Bowne concluded his discussion of things by positing, 
Being in distinction from nonbeing finds its mark in causality. 
Things find the definiteness which they must have in order to 
exist at all in the law of this causality. Differing things 
find the ground of their difference in the different laws of 
the respective causalities. To know this -law is to know the 
thing in itself, or in its inmost essence. The only insoluble 
question in such a case is how the law can be set in reality 
or made substantial; and this question does not belong to hu-
man philosophy. It may be that further study may compel us to 
give up things altogether in distinction from phenomena; but 
so long as we hold them, we must view them not as picturable 
1Borden Parker Bowne, Metaphysics (New York: American Book 
Company, 1910), p. 17. 
2Ibid~, p. 28. 
3Ibid., p. 29. 
4Ibid. 
5Ibid., p. 31. 
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objects, but as concrete and definite principles of action.1 
When discussing "Causality11 Bowne pointed out that living, active 
intelligence is the condition both of conceptual and metaphysical unity. 
Also that volitional causality--intelligence itself in act--is the only 
conception of metaphysical causality in which one can rest. There is 
no alternative; being is either volitional causality or nothing. Through 
the concepts of causality one receives insight into the significance of 
free intelligence. In his own words: "Explanation is possible only 
through free intelligence. Unity; identity, and c.ausality are possible 
only through free intelligence. 112 
In his chapter "The World-Ground", Bowne gave his interpretation 
of the infinite and the finite. For him the infinite was active and 
the cause of the universe. As for the finite, two views are possible 
according to Bowne. One sees the finite as 11a form of energy on the 
part of the infinite, so that it has only phenomenal existence." The 
other looks upon the finite as 11a substantial creation by the infinite. 11 3 
However, as Bowne asserted, "in neither of these views is it possible to 
identify the infinite with the finite either totally or partially. 114 
According to Bowne the only way to decide between the foregoing 
views o:f the finite is to study the facts of experience. Accord.ing to 
him if any finite thing can be found which is capable of acting from 
1Bowne, ~- ~.,;.ip. 43. 
2Ibid., p. 92. 
3Ibid., p. 98. 
4Ibid., p. 99. 
itself and for itself, it has in that fact the only possible test of 
reality, as distinguished from phenomenality. But this possibility can 
be found only in the finite spirit. For "only selfhood serves to mark 
off the finite as substantial reality, and to give it any ontological 
otherness to the infinite."l 
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When discussing the relation of the infinite to the finite Bowne 
held that the infinite was "the primal source of all finite existence."2 
The finite has no being in itself and therefore its nature and its rela-
tion are determined by the i nfinite. The finite may be viewed as the 
expression of the purpose of the infinite. Thus the manifestation of 
the finite is an expression of the plan of the infinite. No finite has 
any rights, except those granted by the infinite. Hence, "every finite 
thing is what it is, and where it is, and when it is, solely and only 
because of the requirements of the fundamental plan."3 
When speaking of a common ground upon which all philosophers 
build Bowne mentioned the following: 
First, the coexistence of persons. It is a personal and social 
world in which we live, and with which all speculation must be-
gin. We and the neighbors are facts which cannot be questioned. 
Secondly, there is a law of r eason valid for ali and binding, 
upon all. This is the supreme condition o'f any mental connnunity. 
Thirdly, there is the world of common experience, actual or pos-
sible, where we meet in mi:tual understanding, and where the great 
business of li'fe goes on. 
lBowne, loc. cit. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid., p. lo4. 
4Borden· Parker Bowne, Personalism {New York: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 19o8), p. vii. 
Bowne explained that the foregoing conditions are absolutely necessary 
in order to give any rational standing to philosophical investigation. 
These three basic conditions cannot be questionedcby any one without 
immediate and obvious ·absurdity. 1 "The basal facts, therefore, for 
philosophy are the personal world, the common reason, and the world of 
experience. "2 It was upon these three principles that Bowne built his 
philosophy of Personalism. 
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Edgar Sheffield Brightman. Brightman was the successor of Borden 
Parker Bmme at Boston University. He was born in 1884 at Holbrook, Massa-
chusetts. He received the A. B. and A. M. from Brown University. Con-
tinuing his studies at Boston University he received the theological 
degree in 1910 and the doctorate in 1912. He was a Boston University 
fellow at Berlin and Marburg. From 1912 to 1915 he was professor of 
philosophy at Nebraska Wesleyan University, and taught at Wesleyan Uni-
versity from 1915 to 1919. From 1919 to the time of his death in 1953 
he was Borden Parker Bowne Professor of Philosophy at Boston University. 
Among Personalists Brightman was especially emphatic in the quest for a 
coherent account of experience. Thus he was a systematic thinker, yet 
he was sensitive to the development of common philosophical perspectives 
which transcend the apparent diversity of present day positions. In his 
criticism of other philosophies the emphasis was on their failure to take 
all the aspects of experience coherently into account. Personality was 
lBowne, Personalism, op. cit., pp. 22~23. 
2Ibid. 
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affirmed to be the key to reality for Brightman.l 
Brightman has been acclaimed as one of the most iiifluential 
philosophers in America. This is based upon the fact that more than 
any other, Brightman attempted to give a coherent and logical explana-
tion of human experience. His understanding of the field of philosophy 
was profound, yet by no means did he claim to have the absolute truth. 
His use of the word Personalism indicated his presupposition 
about the real. 
If we use the real as a word to indicate the whole active universe 
of which our experience is but a tiny fragment, then we may say 
that philosophy is an attempt to discover ~ coherent and unified 
definition of the real. Or, alternatively, philosophy is an at-
tempt to give a reasoned account of experience as a whole. More 
simply still, philosophy is an attempt to discover the whole truth. 2 
Brightman used the empirical method in his philosophy of Person-
alism. H~ justified his use of the empirical method by pointing out that 
sense-experience is the only basis upon which science or philosophy can 
build. There is no other common frame of reference other than experi-
ence of the conscious life. As Brightman put it: 
Science is one stage of reinterpretation of experience, philo-
sophy another. Both science and philosophy are movements of 
experience from a state of confusion and contradiction toward 
a state of order and coherence. Science is such a movement 
within a limited field; philosophy aims to include and inter-
pret all experience in a comprehensive unity.3 · 
1Muelder and Sears, .2J2• ~., p. 510. 
2Edgar Sheffield Brightman, ! Philosophy .2f. Religion (New York: 
Prentice-Hall Inc., 1940), p. 21. 
3Ibid., p. 1. 
In pin-pointing the world-view of Personalism Brightman stated 
. - - . 
that it "interprets reality as a society of persons; there is one Su-
pre.m~ Person'- in and for whose thought and will all physical things 
exist so that they are nothing apart from him."l While discussing 
this Supreme Person Brightman said that the functioning of the Supreme 
Person's will is being for all who exist by Him. Finite persons de-
pend~ on his purpose for their being, and yet their being is self-con-
scious and self-determining. Human consciousness is not identical with 
the consciousness of the Supreme Person. "In finite selves the Supreme 
Person wills the existence of what is genuinely other than himself; so 
- ' 
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that the universe is ultimately a society of selves, not a single self."2 
In defending his Personalism as a world-view Brightman offered 
three arguments as a defense. First: 
The Personalist appeals to the coherence theory as a ground for 
believing that there .is · a unitary and supreme mind in the universe. 
Without this· hypothesis, the order and interaction of nature becomes 
a mystic miracle, and an inexplicable 3act. Thus absolutism and per-
sonalism have a common starting point. 
Second: 
The fact of finite limitation and the nature of self-experience 
proves ••• that finite selves4are really distinct, true "monads" as not part of any other self. 
1Edgar Sheffield Brightman, An Introduction ~Philosophy (New 
York: Henry Holt and Company, 1925), p. 246. 
2Ibid. 
3~., p. 247. 
4Ibid. 
Third: 
Persoruilism is consistent with epistemological dualism which has 
'been es·tablished on other grounds. (He discussed it in an earlier 
chapter of this book.) As has been shown, the dualism of idea and 
object is in .accordance with the fact. of a plurality of persons, 
which an ultimate monism contradicts.l 
In the broadest sense, Personalism is a world-view which makes 
personality the key to all philosophical problems and discussion. For 
Personalism the world of reality is made up of many selves which are 
self-conscious and self-determining. These selves derive their being 
and existence from one Supreme Person, yet they are not parts of the 
one Self. These created selves are individual, private and free. The 
selves are not parts of other persons, or of an Absolute Self.2 
Summary 
The world-view of Absolute Idealism is that reality is to be in-
terpreted in terms of an Absolute Self of which all reality is a part 
or expression. Finite selves are expressions of the Absolute Self. 
The world-view of Personalism is that reality is to be interpreted in 
terms of a Supreme Person of which other selves are creations. Nature 
is an expression of the Supreme Person and finite selves are the ex-
pression of the will of the Supreme Person.3 
!Brightman, 12£ • .£ll• 
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2An excellent resume of Personalism is given in Wieman and Meland's 
American Philosophies of Religion, pp. 139-145. 
3Brightman, !_Philosophy.£! Religion, op. cit., pp. 216-218. 
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III. IDEALISM VIEWS MAN 
Absolute Idealism 
The Human~· In his chapter "The Human Self11 , Royce set forth 
and defended his doctrine of the human person. His argument for his view 
was in answer to the question, "Wherein shall our own metaphysical doctrine 
seek for guidance in this world of complexities? 111 The reply was: 
The concept of the human Self, l~e the concept of Nature, comes to 
us, first, as an empirical concept, founded upon a certain class of 
experiences. But like the concept of Nature, the concept of the 
human Self tends far to outrun any directly observable present facts 
of human experience, and to assume forms which define the Self as 
having a nature and destiny which no man directly observes or yet 
can himself verify.2 
Although there are various ways of viewing the human Self, Royce 
maintains that the most reliable is the empirica l method. His concept 
of the empirical method is that "a certain totality of facts, as viewed 
as more or less immediately given, and as di stinguished from the rest of 
the world of Being. 11 3 This totality of facts is observed by the Self as 
well as society. The actions, body, clothing, and attitudes of the Self 
are but expressions of its nature. To change any of these observable 
facts would tend to change the concept of the Self. As Royce stated: 
For to my neighbor as to myself, I am this man with these acts, this 
body, this presence; I cannot see these facts as my neighbor does, 
nor can he take .my view of them. But we all regard such facts, not 
only as belonging to the Self, but as constitut~ng, in a measure, 
what we regard as the Self of the present life. 
lRoyce, ~· ~., p. 256. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid., p. 257. 
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Along with the external Sel:t' of the phenomenal world there is the 
equally empirical and phenominal Self of the inner life. Royce distin-
guished this Self as the "series or states of consciousness, the feelings, 
thoughts, desires, memories, emotions, and moods. 111 
Royce makes distinctions within the inner empirical Self which do 
and do not belong essentially to the .nature of the Self. In affirming 
the unity of the Self in the confrontation of the not-Self, Royce based 
his argument upon a psychological rather than a purely rational principle. 
He maintains that despite the chaos of experience, the Self of man's inner 
and outer life preserves a genuine but hidden unity. 
His explanation of the psychological principle was: 
that in us men, the distinction between Self and not-Self has a pre-
dominantly social origin, and implies a more or less obviously pre-
sent contrast between being, or as you may for short in general ca~l 
him, an Alter, as just when viewed as the life of the present Ego. 
By this Royce means that an individual's concept of himself as distin-
guished from that which is not-himself is largely determined by society. 
In other words, enviromnent partially if not wholly determines the nature 
of the Self. 
As to the origin of the Self, Royce maintained that the Self of 
each man has "its origin in time, and its development makes it dependent, 
for its contents and its character, upon natural conditions."3 
1Royce, ~· .£!!., p. 257. 
2Ibid.' p. 260. 
3~., p. 246. 
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In Royce's opinion man's self-consciousness, when once developed, 
furnishes him with an insight whereby he can comprehend some of the myster-
ies of nature.l 
Royce states that "the Self is not a Thing but · a Meaning embodied 
in a conscious life. 112 In the present form of existence man catches a 
mere glimpse of the true meaning of the individual Self. As the meaning 
of Self finds expression in man's deeds and in his ideals, he also ob-
tains fragmentary glimpses of the way in which his Self is linked with 
the Absolute Self and with the selves in the general moral order of the 
universe.3 To quote Royce: 
These various transient flashes of insight constitute our pre-
sent type of human experience. And it is their variety, their 
manifoldness, and their fragmentariness, which together are 
responsib~e for all those inconsistencies of our accounts of 
the Self. . 
Hocking's view of the Self was very similar to that of Royce. 
The human self is more than a thing of nature, because it is more 
than a fact: facts are not conscious facts,--the self is; facts 
are not valued,--the self lives on values and is a value; facts 
are present,--the self spans past and future. And because of these 
things, while facts are as they must be, the self is free, it de-
termines, out of a matrix of pl~al possibilities, which one shall 
be the fact of the next moment. 
In the light of the various possibilities which confront the 
1Royce, loc. cit. 
2Ibid., p. 269. 
3~., p. 270. 
4Ibid. 
5nocking, 2£• £.!!:.., p. 442. 
self, Hocking pointed out: 
The self is thus a union of opposites. And because precisely the 
same opposites are discernible in the composition of the larger 
cosmos and must somehow be united there, we may transfer the prob-
lem of this "somehow" in part to the world within, as we do when 
we recognize that the whole is a self. The ultimate evidence for 
the selfhood of the whole is not primarily the evidence of argu~ 
ment, however, nor of analogy, but that of immediate experience, 
interpreted by the dialectic. We, as a group of human selves, 
know that we are not aloni in the universe; that is our first 
and persistent intuition. 
Hocking viewed the body as the bridge of communication between 
minds, and it was a means of getting across to other selves and a way 
by which other selves get across to another mind or self. The body 
becomes for those who can read it a symbol of the individual mind. 
This in no measure means that the individual mind produces the body. 
Rather the body comes to each one, like the rest of nature, from beyond 
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oneself. Hocking's concept of the mind was that at first it was passive 
and then active: what it receives it re-creates. The body, however, is 
in a less plastic state then the mind, but more plastic than the rest of 
nature. ''Thus at birth one has the body (and the mind) bequeathed to us; 
at forty we have the body (and the mind) built by our own wills."2 
Hocking presupposed the ability of the Self to act on its own. He 
said that in the capacity of self-building there is the expression of free-
dom of will. This freedom applies to the sphere of one's choices. It 
gives no absolute mastery of the Nature outside of self. For there are 
lHocking, _2£. ill_., p. 442. 
2Ibtd., p. 294. 
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tides of physical and social circumstance which no man can change. 1 
In discussing the soul of man Hocking said that psychologists 
have been unable to discover a soul separate from the mind of man. It 
is his conclusion then that "the soul is the self of man engaged in get-
ting its bearings in the total universe." 2 
While describing the relationship of the body to the mind, Hock-
ing states that this is the chief puzzle of human nature. According to ~ 
him the "two are fused into one being so closely that it is impossible 
to say where the joint is. 11 3 Therefore, to solve the puzzle of the two 
Hocking offered the following as a temporary solution to the puzzle of 
the mind and body: 
(a) that the mind and body are not the same; 
(b) that · they are inseparably joined in a living person; 
(c) that, to think of our own mind, we manage to think of 
thinking; · · 
(d) that since we cannot directly perceive the thinking of other 
people, we have to get at their minds by way of their bodies, their 
gestures, expressions of emotiof6, language; in the same way, we 
interpret the minds of animals. 
Hocking was careful to avoid saying that there is first a mind, 
and then a body for man. He said, 
The self requires the body to be itself; the visible body is the 
mind made visible to others. The visible musculature of the body 
is the mind's capacity of going across from deliberating to act-
ing, made visible to others. Hence, in decision, the mind does 
not act upon the body as though the body were something else; the 
lHocking, ~· ~·, p. 296 
2Hocking and others, ~· ~., p. 17. 
3Ibid., p. 5. 
4Ibid., pp. 5-6. 
action of the bodily muscles is the mind's act of will, the same 
identical thing--only not as it feels to the mind acting, but as 
it looks to the outside observer.l 
Man, for Hocking, is the being who is capable of thinking and 
using a perfect (or absolute) standard. It is this which makes it pos-
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sible ~or man to reach an understanding and agreement with other human 
beings. The capacity to stand alone, to think alone, to be independent, 
to hold to a different opinion than his neighbor, is a capacity which 
belongs to man being a self.2 
- . . - . -
Summary. Absolute Idealism views man as a self. The quality 
of this self is determined by man's social relationships and experi-
ences. Man is self-conscious and it is this which makes him part of 
the expression of the Absolute Self. Self and body are so intricately 
~ - . . . ·-· - -
woven together that it is impossible to separate the two. The body is 
the means of communication between selves and is therefore an expression 
of the self to which it belongs. Man has the capacity to choose, hold 
to an absolute standard, and can determine his own course of action. 
Personalism 
~ ~ Body. Bowne holds that there is no escape from regard-
ing the soul as something substantially real. The fact that it abides, 
acts, and is acted upon are essential marks of its ontological reality. 
In comparison to the body, the soul is the more real of the two. The 
body is in a pe~petual state of flux and at best, is only a form of in-
luocki~ and others, !?£• .£!:!?.., pp. 477-478. 
2Ibid., pp. 66 and 82. 
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cessant flow of the physical elements. 1 
Bowne viewed the soul as posited by the infinite, and the body 
as simply an order of phenomena connected with the soul which reproduces 
features of the general phenomenal order. Thus the body becomes the 
visible expression of the personality, a means of personal communion, 
and a means for controlling to some extent the inner life.2 
In discussing the origin of souls Bowne held that two views have 
gained prominence in philosophical and theological thought. The first 
is the creationist·:, theory of the reduction o:f mental phenomena to func-
tions of organization; the second is a materialistic theory which Bowne 
rejects as inadequate. The Creationist theory has included two concepts: 
one supposes a pre-existence of souls and the other posits individual 
creation in connection with individual earthly existence.3 Bowne holds 
to the latter. 
For Bowne man is a free individual who can determine, in part, 
if not wholly, his experiences and life. Freedom for Bowne is: 
The power of self-direction, the power to form plans, purposes, 
ideals, and to work for their realization. We do not mean an 
abstract freedom existing by itself, but this power of self-
direction in living men and women. Abstract freedom exists 
as little as abstract necessity. Actual freedom is realized 
only as one aspect of actual life; aRd it must always be dis-
cussed in its concrete significance. 
1Bowne, MetaEh;rsics, op. cit., p. 349. 
2 368. Ibid.' p. 
- . 
3 · Ibid., p. 373. 
' , 
4 Ibid.' p. 405. 
This freedom was no fiction for Bowne. It is a freedom of thinking and 
feeling human beings with some insight into values, and a complex body 
of practical interest; and this freedom means simply the power of self-
direction within certain limits set by their own nature and the nature 
of things. 1 
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Such freedom is presupposed in every department of life according 
to Bowne. It is implicit in the assmnption of responsibility on which 
society is built. "The moral nature in both is mandatory and its retri-
butive aspect is absurd without it."2 This ability or capacity of free-
dom of action is involved in the thought of the personal and rational 
life.3 The clearest case of self-direction is the process of thinking 
itself. Man directs and maintains attention, he criticises the succes-
sive steps of an argument, he looks before and after, he thinks twice 
and reserves his decision. The process goes on within reason itself, 
reason supplying the motive, the norm and the driving force. In Bowne's 
own words, 
Thus life itself spontaneously takes on the form of freedom; and 
if freedom were an unquestioned fact it could h84dly manifest it-
self more unambiguously than it seems to do now. 
Brightman begins his discussion of the world of personalityv±th 
three presuppositions: 
(1) Nature is more than and other than all human minds; 
(2) Matter belongs to an order of being wholly different from any 
lBowne, Metaphysics, op. cit., p. 4o6. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid. 
4Ibid. 
mind or personality, human or divine. 
(3) The nomnental and impersonal being of matter is just as cer-
tain and as inmlediately given as is the conscious being of per-
sonality .1 
Brightman defines personality as: 
A complex but self-identifying, active, selective, feeling, 
sensing, developing experience, which remembers its past (in 
part), plans for its future, interacts with its subconscious 
processes, its bodily organism, and its natural and social en-
vironment, and is able to judge and guide itself and its objects 
by rational and ideal standard.2 
Brightman's definition is an attempt to give a true-to-life 
description of what he found to be the essential !unctions of person-
ality as any man experiences it in his own person. All experience3 is 
complex . Activity and selection are essential personal experiences; 
man is always both doing and preferring. Memory is necessary to the 
unity and identity of personality; when it fails man has amnesia or in 
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some cases dual personality. Responsive striving is a mark of every con-
scious being; and, in a thinking being, purposes generate plans for their 
fulfillment.4 
The relation of the body to the mind (soul) was viewed by Bright-
man as a functional unity. The mind both affects and is affected by 
bodily changes. For him the body is that organ of the universe which 
lEdgar Sheffield Brightman, Nature ~ Values (New York: Abing-
don-Cokesbury Press, 1945), pp. 49-50. 
2Ibid., p. 53. 
3Experience is used as a synoilym for consciousness but it is pre-
ferred as being a more concrete term. 
4Brightman, Nature~ Values, op. cit., p. 54. 
creates a personality, although the spiritual and the intellectual life 
are proof that a personality has powers that a material body does not 
possess and could not explain. 1 
The body and the mind are closely related, but are not one. 
According to Brightman, man can make a clear distinction~ between his 
experience of the body and the body itself; and it is unreasonable to 
identify a cause with its effect. To identify the mind with the body 
is as unreasonable as it would be to say that the refreshment we feel 
on drinking cool water is actually nothing but cold water. 2 To quote 
Brightman, 
If we are to insist that the causes which are essential to the 
existence of personality are all a part of it, then the body, 
the subconsciousness, the air we breathe, the life-giving sun, 
in fact, the whole of nature, must be parts of every person, 
and every person is all bodies, all minds; all things. In or-
der to avoid the utter confusion that arises when causes and 
effects are identified, all things melt into one, and all dis-
tinctions are lost (a.S in certain kinds of absolute idealism 
anerpragmatism), we have only to consult experience and rea-
son. If we take our personality to be just what we experi-
ence it. to be, we can ·identify our personality with our con-
sciousness and also reasonably infer the interaction of per-
sonality with its surrounding world of body and nature and 
God, as well as their interdependenceo3 
To summarize his discussion of the human person Brightman offers 
this condensed definition: 
A person is a uni-ty of complex conscious changes, including all 
its experiences--its memories, its purposes, its values, its 
~rightman, Nature~ Values, op. cit., p. 55. 
2n1a. 
- . 
3· ~., pp. 55-56. 
powers, its activities, and its experienced interactions with 
its enviromnent.l 
Summary. Man as viewed by Personalism is a functional unity 
of body and mind (soul). Man has the capacity to act, determine and 
choose his course of life and action. Man is best described by what 
he experiences. He is capable of intercommunicationV.i-th other persons 
and with the Supreme Person. Man is a complex unity of conscious ac-
tions and interactions with his environment, body, and God. 
IV. THE ETHICAL IMPLICATION OF IDEALISM'S VIEW .OF MAN 
Absolute Idealism 
Absolute Idealism has maintained that man is free, he is capable 
of determining his own life and the type of person he will be. Man is 
the expression of the Absolute Self and therefore is capable of inter-
connnunication with the Self through the social relationships he has 
with other finite selves. Royce reasons from his concept of man to an 
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ethical theory built upon the concept of loyalty. He states in the pre-
face of his volume ~ Philosophy 2f Loyalty that, 
The conception of "Loyalty to Loyalty", as set forth in my 
third lecture, constitutes the most significant part of this 
ethical task. For the rest, if my philosophy is as a theory, 
more or less new, I am still only trying to make articulate 
what I believe to be the true spirit and meaning of all the 
loyal, whoever they may be, and however they define their 
fidelity. The result of conceiving duty in terms of the con-
ception of loyalty which is here expounded is, indeed, if I 
am right, somewhat deep-going and transforming, not only for 
ethics, but for most men's views of truth and reality, and of 
lBrightman, Nature ~ Values, loc. cit. 
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religion.l 
While discussing the nature and the need of loyalt;y Royce main-
tains that the self is in quest of the eternal. He rejects the emphasis 
ot spiritual estrangement as set forth by traditional Christ:lanit;y. Royce 
wanted to know the way that leads human practical life homewards, even it 
that way proved to be infinitely long. He found the wa;y to practical 
living in the concept of loyalt;y.2 
Royce holds that when loyalty is properly defined it is the f'ul-
f'illment of' the-whole moral law. Man can center his entire moral world 
about the rational conception of loyalty. JUstice, charity, industry, 
wisdom, spirituality, and all definable moral virtues are essentially 
in the concept ot loyalt;y.3 
Royce states his definition of' loyalty: 
Loyalty shall mean: The willing and practical and thorough-going 
devotion of a person'.tto · a cause. A man is loyal when, first he 
has some cause to which he is loyal; when-, seond he willingly and 
thoroughly devotes himself to this cause; and when, third he ex-
presses his devotion to some sustained atf: practical wa;y by act-
ing steadily in the service of his cause. 
According to Ro;yce loyalty never means a mere emotion of' life for one's 
cause. It never means merel;y following one's own pleasure. For once 
man's will and desire is fully brought to self-consciousness, it fur-
lJos:lah Royce, ~Philosophy-~ Lcyalty (Bew York: The Macmillan 
COlllJ?any, 1908), p. viii. 
2Ibid., p. 11. 
3Ibid., p. 15. 
4~., p. 17. 
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nishes the only valid reason for man to know what is right and good. 1 
To know one's duty was of primary importance to Royce for as he 
put it: 
If I am to know my duty, I must consult my own reasonable will. 
I alone can show myself' why I view this or this as my duty. But 
on the other hand, if I merely look within myself to find what it 
is that I will, my own private individual nature, apart from due 
training, never gives me an answer to the question: What do I will? 
By nature I am a victim of my ancestry, a mass of world-old passions 
and impulses, desiring and suffering in constantly new ways as my 
circumstances change, and as one another of my natural impulses 
comes to the front. By nature, then, apart from specific training, 
I have no .Personal will of my own. One of the principle tasks of 
my life is to learn to have a will of my own. To learn your own 
will--to create your own will--is one of the largest of' your human 
undertakings.2 
In his discussion of "Loyalty to Loyalty" Royce set forth the 
basic principle of his whole concept of loyalty. According to him 
loyalty is, for the loyal individual, a supreme good, whatever it be, 
for the world in general, the worth of his cause.3 Man in choosing and 
in serving the cause to which he is to be loyal, is to be, in any case, 
loyal to loyalty.4 Royce's thesis was that all the commonplace virtues, 
in so far as they were defensible and effective, were special forms of 
loyalty to loyalty.5 They are to be justified, ~entralized, inspired, 
1Royce, The Philosophy £! Loya_:ty, op. cit., p. 26. 
2 Ibid., p. 31. 
3Ibid., p. 101 .. 
4 Ibid., p. 121. 
5· Ibid., p. 130. 
40 
by the one supreme effort to ~o good, namely, the effort to'!.'.111.ake loyalty 
triumphant in the lives of all men. 1 Royce maintained that all those 
duties which man has learned to recognize as the fundamental duties of 
the civilized individual, the duties every man owes to every man, are 
to be rightly interpreted as special instances of loyalty to loyalty. 2 
When speaking of "Loyalty, Truth, and Reality" Royce said: 
My cause partakes of the nature of the only truth and reality that 
there is. My' life is an effort to manifest such eternal truth, as 
well as I can, in a series of temporal deeds. I may serve my cause 
ill. I may conceive it erroneously. I may lose it in the thicket 
of this world of transient experience. My every human deed may in-
volve a blunder. My mortal life may seem one long series of fail-
ures. But I know that my cause liveth. My true life is hid with 
the cause and belongs to the eterna.1.3 
The ethics of Royce is that man wills to be loyal to a cause. 
Whether that cause be good or evil that is not the question of ethics. 
The question is: Is man loyal to loyalty? In Royce's view immoral ac-
tion would be the failure of man to assert his will and freedom to know 
his duty in the light of loyalty. So the key to morality for him is to 
be loyal in the sense that he defined loyalty. 
Hocking pointed out that Idealism views man as something differ-
ent from the causal or biological machine, and that by virtue of what he 
is, he is worthly of respect.4 He maintains that this is the necessary 
lRoyce, ~ Philosophy ~ Loyalty, loc. cit. 
2Ibid.' p. 139. 
3Ibid.' p. 348. 
4nocking, Types £!Philosophy, op. cit., p. 310. 
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foundation under the whole ethical system.l 
According to Hocking all ethical principles are contained in one: 
"Universalize thyself. 112 "Consider thyself a unique being, a view of 
reality granted to no other, which is thy destiny to express. Express 
this latent idea, make thy private feeling or intuition of the world 
the universal sense. 113 
For Hocking the ethical life begins with the "summons to take 
experience as something more than subjective pantomine; sensation it-
self I know I 'ought' to take as a sign of objective truth. 114 Man's 
first duty is to gain and keep a common footing with the rational life 
around him. Regard for truth is the primary condition of any further 
moral progress; how far any two minds can get in mutuality depends 
directly on the degree of their sincerity toward each other.5 That 
is, man can serve men only by first serving what appears to be the 
mere abstract elements of reason in the world, objective truth and 
right.6 
Summary. Absolute Ideali sm viewed man as a rational being with 
lHocking, ~ of Philosophy, loc. cit. 
2Ibid., p. 318. 
3Ibid. 
4 ~., p. 139. 
5Ibid. -
6Ibid. 
-
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the capacity to adhere to an absolute standard. Royce set up a standard 
of loyalty as the key to ethical existence for man. Ethical living for 
Hocking is the adherence to an objective standard of truth and right. 
These two standards of ethical living are objective standards to which 
the moral man can adhere according to Absolute .Idealism 
Personal ism 
Bowne took his ethical concepts from the three leading moral 
ideas given by Schleierme.cher: The good, duty, and virtue. 1 According 
to Bowne these ideas are essential in a system which is to express the 
complete moral consciousness of the race. He reasoned that where there 
is no good to be reached by action, there can be no rational duty, and 
with the notion of duty vanishes also that of virtue.2 Behind these 
three concepts of good, duty, and virtue lay Bowne's concept of man as 
a free, rational, and selfeconscious person, or self. 
Moral action, for Bowne, must come under the head of rational 
action; and action to be rational must have some end beyond itself. 
Action for form's sake, action which ends in itself and leaves things 
where they were before, is irrational and purposeless. He maintained 
that there can be no obligation of mischievious action or to indifferent 
action. Therefore the ground of obligation to action lies in some good 
to which the action could be directed.3 To quote Bowne: 
lBorden Parker Bowne, The Principles 2f Ethics (New York: American 
Book Company, 1892), p. 20. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid., p. 26. 
It (action) must be directed toward a good and must find in that 
good the ground of its authority. As the deepest thing in society 
is not law, but a set of social and personal goods to which the 
law is instrmnental, so the deepest thing in the moral life cannot 
be. moral law, but some good and goods to which that law is instru-
mentar.l 
In speaking of the idea of the moral Bowne said that the idea of 
moral obligation arises within the mind itself. However, when the idea 
comes, it has no external origin, and admits no definition except in 
terms of itself. 2 The right to which obligation refers is simply a 
perceived good; and the affirmation of obligation is the act by which 
the mind imposes duty upon itself in the presence of such a good.3 The 
free spirit thus imposes duty upon itself which in turn gives meaning 
and experience to moral obligation.4 
Bowne concluded his volume on ethics with the following ethical 
principles which have been included to give an over-all view of his 
ethics. 
l. That was not first which was spiritual, but that which was 
natural, and afterward that which was spiritual. But the spir-
itual is not something apart from the natural, as a kind of de-
tached movement; it is rather the natural itself, rising toward 
its ideal form through the free activity of the moral person. 
The natural can be understood. only through the spiritual, to 
which it points; and the spiritual gets contents only through 
the natural, in which it roots. 
2. As a consequence, the field of ethics is life itself, and 
itmnediately, the life that now is. And our moral task is to 
make this life, so far as possible as expression of rational 
good-will. 
lBowne, ~ Principles 2f. Ethics, lac. cit. 
2· Ibid., p. 102. 
3Ibid. 
4ibid. 
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3. For life has two poles. It demands for its perfection both 
outward fortune and happiness and inward worth and peace. 
4. The moral life finds its chief field of service of the com-
mon good. 
5. The greatest need in ethics is the impartial and unselfish 
will to do right. 
6. Presupposing this will to do right, the great need in ethical 
theory is to renounce abstractions, as virtue, pleasure, happi-
ness, and come into contact with reality. 
7. The great need of ethical practice, next to the good will, is 
the serious and thoughtful application of intellect to the prob-
lems of life and conduct. 
8. We shall also do well to remember that righteousness is nothing 
which can be achieved once for all, whether for the individual or 
for the community. 
9. In a very important sense the respectable cl.ass is the dangerous 
class in the community. By its example it degrades the social con-
ception of the meaning of life, and thus materializes, vulgarizes, 
and brutalizes, the public thought. 
10. In the application of principles to life there will long be a 
neutral frontier on the borders of moral life, where consequences 
and tendencies · have not so clearly declared themselves as to ex-
clude differences of opinion among men of good will. 
11. Finally, in reducing principles to practice we must be on our 
guard against an abstract and impracticable idealism. Even in the 
personal life conscience may be a measureless calamity, unless re-
strained by a certain indefinable good sense. Many principles look 
·~'.! fair and even ideal when considered in abstraction from life, which 
cannot, however, be applied to life without the most hideous or 
disasterous and socialistic quacks. Ethics when divorced from 
practical wisdom prevents the attainment of its ovn ends. The ab-
stract ethics of the closet must be replaced by the ethics of life, 
if we would not see ethics lose itself in barren contentions and 
tedious verbal disputes.l 
Brightman de:fined ethics as "the normative science of morals, 
which means .that it is the attempt to discover and justify reasonable 
standards of conduct. 112 The implications of Brightman's definition 
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are made explicit in his three basic concepts. They are: law (principles), 
lBowne, The Principles of Ethics, op. cit., pp. 3o4-309. 
2Edgar Sheffield Brightman, Moral ~ (New York: The Abingdon 
Press, 1933), p. 13. 
value (the good), and obligation (ought, duty). 1 The purpose of the 
science of ethics is to reveal what value {good) ought (duty) to be 
attained. 2 It must explain the obligation to achieve the good.3 
The basis for Brightman's ethics was that of experience. By 
experience he meant the whole field of consciousness, every process or 
state of awareness within it; not sensation alone, nor scientifically 
interpreted experience alone. Consciousness is not to be in contrast 
with reason or speculation, but, rather, in contrast with the absence 
of experience, or unconsciousness.4 
Brightman pointed out that experience is always complex. It is 
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ongoing activity. In the sense in which he used experience it contained 
both what has been called empirical and what bas been called transcen-
dental (rational) factors.5 To quote Brightman: 
Moral experience, in the broad sense, included not only the act 
of voluntary choice, but also the experiences chosen--the con-
sciousness of value, of obligation, and of law •••• Moral ex-
perience occurs only in persons. t person may be defined as a 
being capable of moral experience. 
Brightman's view of man as a r a tional being capable of choice 
came to be the foundation upon which he built his ethics. As he put it: 
lBrightman, Moral ~' loc. cit. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid.' p. 14. 
4Ibid. 
5Thid., p. 56. 
- . 
6Ibid.' p. 58. 
If choice is not possible, the science of ethics is not possible. 
If rational, purposive choice is not effec~ive in the control of 
life, good is not poss ible. When we discuss the nature of will 
and freedom, therefore, we are dealing with an absolutely central 
and essential foundation of ethics.i 
Brightman constructed a system of mora l laws around which he or-
ganized his concept of ethical principles. This system of moral laws 
is contained in brief form in Appendix B. of this study. 
Summary. Personalism viewed man as capable of moral action. 
This action was to contain three concepts of what is moral: the good, 
duty, and virtue. Moral action is possible only under rational action. 
The basis of ethics for Personalism is upon experience. Experience in-
eluding in this case both rational and empirical elements. The fact 
that man is a free, independent, rational creature makes it possible 
for him to attain to moral standards. To act less than in a rational 
way is innnoral. 
lBrightman, Moral ~' op. cit., p. 74. 
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CHAPTER III 
MAN IB EXISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHY 
CHAPTER III 
MAN IN EXISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHY 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Within recent years there has arisen a school of thought known 
as Existentialism. Although it is relatively new on the philosophical 
scene, nevertheless, Existentialism has had roots which extend into 
history. Blaise Pascal was the father of the Existential. 1 With his 
deep interest in man Pascal began a philosophical movement which was 
passed from one generation to another and from one country to another. 
The most prominent man to influence Existentialism on the modern 
scene was the Danish theologian-philosopher, Soren Kierkegaard, The 
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work and writings of Kierkegaard were primarily in protest to the cold 
formalism of the Danish State Church and. the impersonal, deterministic 
idealism of Hegel. Kierkegaard, who vas of a very sensitive and intro-
spective nature, was greatly influenced by his father. His father was 
in constant dread that he had committed the unforgivable sin. It was a 
natural consequence that Kierkegaard shoul d also exhibit in his life the 
same concept of dread and inward gloom. These concepts carried over in-
to his thinking and writing.2 
lsee Frank Tbilly's book~ Historz .2f Philosophy (New York: Henry 
Holt and Company, 1914), pp. 250-503. 
2J. M. Spier, Christianity and EXistentialism, trans. D. H. Freeman 
(Philadelphia: The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1953), 
pp. 7-9. 
Soren Kierkegaard had two fundamental presuppositions upon which 
he built his theology, psychology, and philosophy. According to Hugh 
Ross Mackintosh, the)" were: 
First, the principle of spiritual inwardnes~, or as it is often 
called, subjectivity, has a determinative influence on all his ' 
thinking. By inwardness is meant the personal appropriation of 
Divinely presented truth, its apprehension with or through pas-
sion. • • • The second. • • is the rooted distrust of Hegelian 
philosophy in which, after years of storm and stress, be had 
ended. He now_,,..rested in an immovable conviction that Hegelian-
ism, wit~"t'E(serene objectivity and optimistic acceptance of the 
actual/ is the worst possible framework in which authentic Christ-
ian/oelief can be set.l 
,/ 
~ Kierkegaard emphasized the personal decision and choice of man. 
In his writings and articles he stressed continually the predicament 
of man with reference to the three levels or stages at which men could 
live. The first level or stage is that of the aesthetic. The men who 
lived on this level are hedonistic. Pleasure or enjoyment are primary 
values, whether that enjoyment is mental or physical. This type of 
existence is without meaning or unity. 2 
The second level or stage of existence is that of the ethical. 
On this level man enjoys some of the warmth and wholesomeness of a life 
shared with others. There is development of the personality but only 
in a limited or partial sense.3 
The third level or stage of existence is that of the religious. 
This level of existence brings man face to face with the Will behind 
lHugh Ross Mackintosh, Types £! Modern Theology (London: Nisbet 
and Company, 1947), pp. 224, 225. 
2Ibid., pp. 231-232. 
3Ibid. 
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all things, the Will that perpetually demands his de.cision. 1 On this 
level of existence man exper iences and discovers that meaning of faith. 2 
Faith for Kierkegaard is "the deepest passion, the most audacious and 
incredible paradox in which the human spirit can be involved") Through 
faith man is able to approach God. 
Upon His · absoluteness we can lay hold only through the struggle 
of faith, in which (to take one example) the No of doubt and fear 
evoked by His felt holiness is o'ercome and absorbed.by the ¥es 
of trust engendered by His love. 
The whole thrust of Kierkegaard's thinking was that man could 
know God only in the personal rel.8tionship, not by logical Syllogisms. 
God and man stand alone and in that aloneness man can either say Yes 
to God or No. When the Yes is given the No is there also, because in 
Kierkegaard's dialectical method the truth lay between the two answers. 
Later in history this same line of thought was taken up by Karl Barth. 
Kierkegaard was influential only after his death. His Christian 
presuppositions had little influence upon the later philosophers who 
took up his method. But before something can be said concerning the 
atheistic Existentialists of today; there must be an ~la.nation of the 
Existential principle as it has been propagated in recent times. 
~ Existential Principle 
It has been found that the principle or method known as Existen-
lMackintosh, !?£· cit., p. 232. 
2Ibid.' p. 233. 
- . 
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tialism is that principle which distinguishes the essence or nature of a 
thing from its existence. Upon this one principle all Existentialists 
have agreed: existence precedes essence. To define existence without 
destroying the principle of Existentialism ·.has been nearly an impossi-
bility for the Existentialists. Essence and definition to the Existen-
tialists are correlative terms. To describe a thing or person is to 
give it essence. Existence is undefinable. For when existence is de-
fined it was no longer existence, it becomes essence. Hence existence 
always precedes essence and there is no definition for either. 1 
Some Definitions of Existentialism 
According to William Barrett in his article ''What is Existen-
tialism", Existentialism 
is a philosophy that conf'ronts the human situation in its totality 
to ask what the basic conditions of human existence are and how man 
can establish his own meaning out of these conditions. Its method 
is to begin with this human existence as a fact without any ready-
made preconceptions about the essence of man. There is no prefabri-
cated human nature that freezes human possibilities into the preor-
dained mold; on the contrary, man exists first and makes himself 
what lie is out of the conditions into which he is thrown. "Exis-
tence precedes essence", as the formula puts it. 2 
J. M. Spier in his book Christianity and Existentialism said that 
according to the leading exponents of Existentialism, it 
is a philosophy of the meaninglessness of life, of the nihility, 
and mortality of human existence which is devoid of any prospect 
or future.j 
1vergilius Ferm (ed.), ! HistoJ:' £!:Philosophical Systems (New 
York: The Philosophical _Library, 1950 , p. 405. 
2William Barrett, "What is Existentialism?", The Saturday Evening 
Post, November 21, 1959, p. 126. 
3spier, ~· .£!!., p. xvii. 
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In his evaluation of the philosophic background of Existentialism, 
Spier stated that Existentialism is based upon the religious motives 
of nature and freedom, and that it is irrationalistic in character. 
In his thinking Existentialism is the same as humanism; for humanism 
is committed to a faith in the autonomous freedom of' hmnan personality, 
and no matter how much the various brands of Existentialism differ, they 
all agree that man is absolutely autonomous. 1 
In evaluating the non-philosophic background of' Existentialism, 
Spier pointed out that Existentialism represents a withdrawal from the 
rational to an irrationalistic structure of the autonomous human person-
ality. Existentialism uses concrete human experience as a first prin-
ciple. Existentialists do not base their philosophy upon an abstraction 
of' pers.onality such as reason, pure consciousness, or something similar. 
It is based upon the concrete individual with his anxiety, futility, and 
despair, but also with his resolute determination to account for his hope-
less situation and seek a final stronghold from which he can existentiallz 
experience and accept his own concrete existence. Existentialism is 
anthropology first of all. Some of its representatives have attempted 
to arrive at an ontology but even their primary interest is anthropology. 2 
Dr. Carl Michalson in his lectures on ~ is Existentialism at 
the Iowa State University, February 25, 1958, gave a somewhat facetious 
definition of Existentialism: "Existentialism is a clandestine marriage 
lspier, ~· c~t., p. 6. 
2Ibid.' p. 16. 
between Nordic Melancholy and Parisan Pornography. 111 Then in a more 
sober vein Michalson gave the major concepts of Existentialism, which 
have been quoted in part from the class notes of Eldon Fuhrman: 
1. Individualism: no regulated quest for first principles, for it 
goes back to persons, not merely as a man, but as a person. 
2. Freedom: let man be. One is free to so act as to allow others 
to remain free. Man must be free to develop. 
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3. Existence: to stand beyond or out of oneself. God does not exist 
(go beyond himself), nor do animals. Man is the being who exists. 
4. Atheism: if God exists then man is not free. Everything imust be 
permitted; man must be free to negotiate life for himself. 
5. Committment: Existentialism tries to close the gap between ideas 
and actions. It says you are what you think; what you think you 
are. You must act where you think~ You must commit yourself to 
your thoughts or else change your thoughts. Get out of the bal-
cony and participate. To know a thing you can not stand at a 
distance. You must immerse yourself into the reality into which 
you are engaging. 
6. Nothingness: Existentialism is an encounter with nothingiless. 
Life is ultimately meaningless, is shot through with holes. 
Where we stand life is meaningless. There is an abyss in our 
wake, etc. As a cat on a hot tin roof. Where will we leap? 
From nothingness to nothingness in our search for authenticity. 2 
Now that some definitions of Existentialism have been set forth, 
as well as some of the basic principles and concepts, the next section 
will deal with the leading exponents of Existentialism. To avoid con-
fusion the discussion has been divided into two sections. The first 
section will cover the leading Atheistic Existentialists and the se-
cond section will deal with the leading Theistic Existentialists. 
lWhat is Existentialism, Carl Michalson, a lecture give at Iowa 
State University, on February 25, 1958, taken from the class notes of 
Eldon Fuhrman. 
2Ibid. 
II. TIPES OF EXISTENTIALISM 
Atheistic Existentialism 
Martin Heidegger. Heidegger was born in 1889. He was strongly 
influenced by the phenomenology of Husserl during his educational pur-
suits. Phenomenology in its methods seeks to inspect essence. This 
inspection of essence can only be applied after a "transcendental re-
duction" 1 has taken place. In this reduction a thing is abstracted 
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from its concrete individual existence and the essence of phenomena are 
contemplated in pure consciousness, and are then inspected and described. 2 
In 1928 Heidegger succeeded Husserl as professor of philosophy at 
the University of Freiberg. He retained Husserl's method of phenomeno-
logy. His most important work, in which he developed his existentialist 
views, was published in 1927 under the title Sein ~ ~· Heidegger 
was known only by his close associates until his thought became widely 
known through the writings of his former student, Jean-Paul Sartre.3 
Among the contemporary exponents of existential philosophy, Hei-
degger is perhaps the most significant and most likely to hold a secure 
place in the history of thought. The importance of Heidegger lies in 
the deliberateness with which 1he makes an analysis of what human life 
has to say for itself without the introduction of any transcendent refer-
lspier, .2.E.• £.!:!:.., p. 27. 
2Ibid. 
-
ence, and also without drawing any conclusions.l 
Heidegger is a philosopher of existence. He has used the same 
method Decartes used to solve the perennial riddle of reality. Only 
Heidegger put Decartes's proposition in reverse. Heidegger's proposi-
tion was "not cogito ergo~' but~ ergo cogito. 112 He began and 
continued his examination into the nature of existence where he finds 
existence immediately at hand. Heidegger applies the phenomenological 
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method of analysis to human existence. He asked the question: How does 
rrry existence reveal itself? His answer was that human existence is char-
acterized by "ex-sistence--it is ex-static--not so much emotionally as 
cognitively; we stand out of ourselves."3 
Heidegger employed the term Da-sein to describe the self-aware-
ness which man has in existence. For Heidegger man is always present 
to himself. He finds himself in the world. When man finds himself in 
the world he asks himself the question, Was I simply thrown into it? 
Thus, according to Heidegger, man becomes aware of the problem of time, 
not as a general question but by being caught up into a stream of events 
that carries him along. This awareness of finding himself in the world 
that is not his own, and yet in which he must continue to be, fills life 
with a sense of anxiety.4 
lJames s. Thomson, 11The Existential Philosophy," Philosophy 
Today, Summer 1958, volume II, p. 100. 
2Ibid~' p. 101. 
3Ibid. 
4~., p. 102. 
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As Heidegger viewed it, life is not what it ought to be, for man 
falls beneath real existence. Yet man cannot disavow responsibility, 
so that he has a positive sense of guiltiness about life. Nevertheless, 
existence runs on to non-existence, which is death. Heidegger is vague 
in explaining what he ·means by non-exist ence, he prefers to allow exist-
ence to speak for itself.l 
According to Thomson, Heidegger propounds no doctrine, constructs 
no theories; rather he seems to say, "If you want positivism, real down-
to-earthism, here is what we have on hand. This is existence."2 
Jean-Paul Sartre. Sartre was born in 1905. Besides being a 
philosopher, Sartre is the author of numerous literary works. As a 
philosopher, Sartre was a student of Heidegger and Husserl. However, 
Decartes, Hegel, and Freud exerted an influence upon his thought. His 
philosophical method is an intertwining of the phenomenology of Husserl 
with the dialectic of Hegel.3 
Sartre's main philosophical work was entitled L1Etre et le Neant 
(Being and Nothingness)4 and was published first in 1943. He has also 
written a brief summary of his thought in Existentialism is ! Humanism. 
And just before the last war he wrote books on scientific psychology and 
1Thomson, ~· cit., p. 102. 
2Ibid. 
3spier, ~· ~. , p. 60. 
4sartre's Being and Nothingness has been t r anslated by Hazel T. 
Barnes (New York: The Phiiosophical Library, 1956). 
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on the phenomenology of Husserl. 1 
Sartre passed along the same strange pathway to real existence as 
Heidegger. For Sartre, the search is the prelude to self-realization. 
Over against the nothingness of the world, man can enter upon the sole 
possession of himself, determined by no constraint other than what he 
wants to be. ~Man has but himself, and to enter upon this estate is to 
taste real freedom. This is the theme of Sartre's Being~ Nothingness 
which he summed up in these words: "Freedom is precisely that Nothingness 
which arises in the heart of man and which compels human reality to make 
itself instead of being. n2 
Existential thought is thus for Sartre: "The process of disen-
chantment, through which man learns how to achieve his own destiny."3 
When man has himself, he has everything. Man must achieve his 
own self-transcendence. Man must become his own God, 
and if man has a preontological understanding of the being of 
God, it is neither the great insights of nature nor the power 
of society that have conferred it on him; but God, as value 
and chief aim of transcendence, represents the final point at 
which man makes himself announce who he himself is. To be a 
man is to stretch out towards being God,4or if you prefer it, man is fundamentally a desire to be God. 
Sartre devoted a long passage near the end of Being and Nothipg-
ness to the discussion of the sin of Adam and Eve. He insisted that 
Adam fell from his original estate because he accepted the rule of God. 
lspier, loc. cit • 
.,..._. 
2Th~on, .!££_. ~· 
3ibid. 
- ·. 
4· Ibid., pp. 102-103. 
Adam's sin was his failure to be Adam.l Thomson characterized Sartre 
as the reincarnation of Nietzsche who held that man's destiny is to 
achieve the Superman. Only for Sartre, the Superman lies in the depth 
of man's being. In the concluding chapter to his aforementioned book 
Sartre sketched three stages of disenchantment: "To have, to do, and 
to be."2 The question comes however, To be What? Sartre would say, 
Nothing. 
Atheistic Existentialism assumes the basis of existence to be 
that man recognize his ,utter futility in changing his time-bound 
world. Heidegger and Sartre both apply Husserl's method of phenomeno-
logy in interpreting existence. They stress the self awareness of ma.n 
a:id that for:..man to be himself is the key to real existence or the escape 
from non-existence. A note of despair and futility runs through Atheistic 
Existentialism. Outside of human existence, being is nothing, being is 
meaningless, chaotic, absurd.3 
Theistic Existentialism 
~ Barth. Barth was born in 1886. He took his studies at the 
Universities of Berne, Berlin, Tuebingen, and Marburg. Among the men 
who influenced Barth the most were Kierkegaard, Dostievski, Oberbeck, and 
the Blumhardts. He began his pastoral ministry at Geneva, Switzerland 
where he remained for two years. He then was pastor at Safenwil for the 
Lrb.omson, op. cit., p. 103. 
2Ibid. 
3spier, 21?.• cit., p. 31. 
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next ten years. At Safenwil, under the shadow of the _war of 1914 to 
1918, he was led to a radical questioning of current theological notions, 
and wrote his Commentary~ Romans. The critical power and the pessimism 
of the post-war situation at once gave Barth a very wide hearing among 
German-speaking Protestant theologians. In 1921 he became Professor at 
Goettigen and later Professor at Muenster. 1 
When Adolph Hitler came to power, Barth. was deprived of his chair 
Si Muenster because he refused to take the oath of allegiance to the 
Fuehrer. He left Germany and in 1939 became professor of theology at 
Basle. In 1939 he ·:iwas deprived of his doctorate of the University 
of Muenster, but in 1945 it was restored. 2 
Barth's main literary works have been The Word of God and Theo-
.!2Sl (1924), Theology and~ Church (1928), and Dogmatics (1946).3 
Although much could be said about Barth's theology and his con-
tribution to Protestant Christianity, for the purposes of this study 
his theory of crisis and view of man is the primary concern. 
Barth; more faithful to Kierkegaard's intention than Heidegger 
or Sartre, looked upon crisis as the triumph of faith won through the 
discomfiture of reason. For Barth, reality is disclosed through the 
anguish of the human situation, and reality is God. However, Barth's 
God is not the God of the philosophers, but the God of Abraham, Issac, 
1F. L. Cr oss (ed.), The Oxford Dictionary£!~ Christi an Church 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 135. 
2Ibid __ 9 
and Jacob; the God who had spoken through the prophets; the God who 
was revealed in the person of Jesus Christ. 1 
For Barth the surrender of autonomous reason a t the climax of 
the inner drama became the contrite sinner hearing the Word of God. 
The conclusion drawn by Barth from his theory of crisis is itself not 
a philosophical but a biblicism which denounces philosophy as an inept 
guide towards faith. 2 
According to Barth the crisis of man has a two-fold ~meaning. 
Crisis is the supreme law of this world, the hint of the Lawgiver, who 
as such is above His law. It is also the turning point to the better. 
It is the limiting-fence and a way out. It is the end and a new start. 
It is Yes and No. It is the landmark of Divine wrath and the landmark 
of approaching Divine deliverance.3 
Barth has taken the Existential principle of crisis and personal 
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decision in the midst of anxiety and retained it within a Christian con-
text. Later in his career Barth admitted that he had carried the Exis-
tential principle into his first edition of his Dogmatics. In the pre-
face of his second edition he said, 
To the best of my ability I have cut out in this second issue of 
the book everything that in the first issue might give the slight-
est appearance of giving theology a basis, support,4or even a mere justification in the way of existential philosophy. 
lFerm, ~· ~., p. 410. 
2Ibid. 
3R. Birch Hoyle, ~Teaching .£!~Barth (London: Student 
Christian Movement Press, 1930), p. 135. 
~ackintosh, ~· ~., p. 264. 
When speaking of the being of God and reality Barth contended 
that the being of God is found only in the act of his revelation, and 
that ontological speculation has been to a great degree the error in 
the Church's doctrine. He asserts that when man asks questions about 
reality he is actually asking questions about God. According to Barth 
God is being, but being is not God. The question of the being of God 
is only answered in God's revelation of himself through Jesus Christ.1 
Barth explains that when, on the basis of God's revelation, man 
defines God as event, act, and life, he does not identify God with the 
sum or essence of event, act, and life in general. God's revelation is 
a special event, not identical with the sum or essence of all events in 
either nature or history. Therefore it is not sufficient to denote God 
as pure act. God is the origin, reconciliation, and goal of all other 
events. God distinguishes himself from all other actuality, not only 
in that he is actuality itself, its principle or nature, but in that 
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he is tree event, tree act, tree lite, in himselt.2 Barth insists that 
God'' s being is the being of a person, ot the original and intrinsic per-
son. He stands in marked contrast to the impersonal and nonconcrete 
being of God taught by Paul Tillich. For Barth God is not being itself, 
nor is He pure existence 1 God is really a being whom in prayer man ad-
dresses as "Thou" and who speaks to man as "I am."3 
lArthur c. Cochran, The Existentialists and God (Philadelphia: 
The Westminster Press 1 1956" P• 115. - -
2Ibid., P• 116. 
-
3Ibid., p. 118. 
~ Brunner. Brunner was born in 1889. He is a native of 
Winterhur, Switzerland, and from 1916 to 1922 he served as pastor ap 
Obstalden. From 1922 to 1938 he taught at Zurich and from 1938 at 
Princeton. He was one of Karl Barth's foremost supporters in pro-
testing against immanence in religion and Christian mysticism. But 
on the other hand he holds that a genuine element of truth is contained 
in the Catholic doctrine of analogy, a position for which he was taken 
severly to task by Karl Barth. 1 
His writings include ~ Philosophy £! Religion f!:2! ~ Stand-
point £! Protestant Theology ( 1926), ~ Mediator (1927), The Divine 
Imperative (1923), and~ in Revolt (1937). 2 
Brunner in his ~ in Revolt discussed his relationship to 
Existential philosophy under the heading of "Philosophical and Theo-
logical Anthropology." He maintained that faith must never renounce 
its own ontology. 
Being--not merely the eKistent--as being created, and indeed as 
being created by and in the Word of God, is equally a being of 
its own kind as the Being of God is the ground of all that exists, 
and of His manner of being. There is absolutely no definition 
which is more "original" than this: Creator and creature. God 
is the Creator not only of all that exists, but also of all the 
forms of existence, just as there is no reason which is higher 
than God in which the Divini Being might share--God is the 
Creator also of the reason. 
lcross, .2£• cit., p. 202. 
2Ibid. 
3Emil Brunner, Man in Revolt, trans. Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: 
The Westminster Press, 1957J, pp. 542-543. 
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Brunner maintained that .the "thought of being of the existent 
is fundamentally different according as the idea of the Creator lies 
behind it or not. 111 There is no neutral being. Every idea of being 
betrays its background, whether it be that of metaphysics or of faith. 2 
Brunner was less reluctant than Barth to draw the lines of 
relationship between his position and that held by Existential philo-
sophers. Brunner said it was no accident that Kierkegaard was the 
originator of the Existential principle. He criticized Heidegger and 
Sartre for divorcing the Existential principle from its Christian pre-
suppositions. 3 
Reinhold Niebuhr. Niebuhr was born in 1892 at Wright City, 
Missouri. He was educated at Elmhurst College and Yale University and 
in 1915 was ordained. He was pastor at the Bethel Evangelical Church 
of Detroit from 1915 to 1928, when he was appointed p~ofessor of Applied 
Christianity at the Union Theological Seminary in New York City.4 
Niebuhr was influenced by the Dialectical Theology of Karl Barth, 
and finds central place for myth and paradox in theology. But he insists 
against Barth that Christianity has a direct prophetical vocation in re-
lation to culture.5 
lBrunner, £1!• £!!., p. 543. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid., p. 544. 
4
cross, ~· cit., p. 958. 
5Ibid. 
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Niebuhr's principle work is ~Nature ~Destiny 2£ Man (1941-43). 
He has also written Moral~~ Immoral Society (1932)and An Interpre-
tation~ Christian Ethics (1936). 1 
For Niebuhr secular views of man and the world were rejected as 
misleading and inadequate. The secular interpretations of idealistic-
liberalism and naturalistic-proletarianism have ended in illusion be-
cause they can not comprehend the heights and depths of man and the 
world. According to Niebuhr the con:fusion of man trying to cope with 
the present situation stems from the separation of inan from the sources 
of religion, out of which correcting and transforming forces come. 2 
Niebuhr's main interest has been in the social and ethical impli-
cations of the Christian message. His emphasis upon the tragedy of the 
human situation, the crisis experience through anxiety has shown his 
assumption of the Existential principle. Since Niebhur has written 
primarily on man, his views will be discussed in the section on man. 
Paul Tillich. Tillich was bo~n in 1886. He was. the son of a 
~
Lutheran pastor and he studied at the Universities of Berlin, Tuebingen, 
and Halle. During the First World War he served as an army chaplain. 
In 1924 he became professor of theology at Marburg, and in 1925 professor 
of theology at the Technical Hochschule at Dresden. In 1929 he became 
professor of philosophy at Frankfurt. Compelled by his connection with 
the Religious Socialists to leave Germany in 1933, he settled in the 
lcross, 212· £!:!?.., p. 959. 
2Hans Hof'mann, ~ Theology £! Reinhold Niebuhr, trans. Louise 
Pettibone Smith (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1956), p. 89. 
United States where he was appointed professor of philosophical theology 
at the Union Theological Seminary. In 1940 he became an American citizen. 
His thought has been much influenced by Karl Barth and Existentialism. He 
is recognized as one of the leading contemporary exponents of Protestant-
ism.1 
Among the more important of his writings are Biblical Religion 
and ~ Search ~Ultimate Reality (1951) and Systematic Theoloey (vol. 
I 1951 and vol. II 1957).2 
The three leading concepts of Tillich's thought were being, non-
being, and being-itself. These concepts correspond in some measure to 
Heidegger's Da-sein, nothing, and being. There is a leading principle 
which is perhaps the key to Tillich's whole system: The idea of corre-
lation. In his Systematic Theology he explained his method of correla-
tion. 3 "Primarily it is epistemological. 114 To quote Tillich: 
There is a correlation in the sense of correspondence between the 
religious symbols and that which is symbolized by them. There is 
a correlation in the logical sense between concepts denoting the 
human and those denoting the divine. There is a correla~ion in 
the factual sense between man'~ ultimate concern and that about 
which is ultimately concerned. 
It is important that one understand that the method of correlation is 
1cross, ~· cit., p. 1358. 
2Ibid., p. 1359. 
3cochran, ~· ~., p. 77. 
4Ibid. 
5paul Tillich, Systematic Theology (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1951), I, p. 60. 
11an element of the reality itself. 111 Epistemologically the method of 
correlation is justifiable because the subjects studied are ontically 
correlated. According to Cochran unless this point is kept in mind 
the student cannot do justice to Tillich's thought. 2 
As Cochran pointed out there are three leading concepts in 
Tillich's philosophy: being, nonbeing, and being-itself. One is ob-
liged to examine each of these concepts separately if. he is to under-
stand Tillich. It is well to bear in mind that none of these concepts 
of realities exist in isolation. They exist in correlation and inter-
dependence.3 
We discern three parts of correlation in Tillich's system: Being, 
and nonbeing (finite being), being-itself and nonbeing (God), and 
finite being and being-itself. There is thus a dialectic in man, 
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a dialectic in God, and a dialectic between God and man. All three 
are interdependent and interpenetrable. Being reveals nonbeing and 
nonbeing reveals being. Together they reveal being-it~elf and at 
the same time being-itself (God) reveals finite being. 
With his principle of correlation, Tillich was able to be both a 
philosopher and a theologian at the same time. Philosophy asks the ques-
tion of being as being, whereas theology is concerned about the question 
of God.5 As Tillich put it, "Systematic theology cannot and should not 
enter into the ontological discussion as such. Yet it can and must con-
sider these central concepts from the point of view of their theological 
lcochran, .9J?.· .£.!!., p. 78. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid. 
-
4~. 
5Ibid. 
-
significance. 111 This implies that theology is obliged to take ontology 
into account not only for its doctrine of man but also for its doctrine 
of God. Tillich holds that theology cannot and ought not to be indepen-
dent of philosophy. They are correlated and interdependent.2 
Cochran's summary of Tillich was, 
Tillich's thought has a comprehensiveness and finality that evoke 
profound admiration even where it failed to gain assent. There is 
something "Hegelian", something distinctJ.ry "Germanic" about his 
achievement. A man who can assimilate Greek and Judaeo-Christian 
traditions to his system, who can survey the realm of human learn-
ing and see it whole, and who can then offer us a reasoned, logi-
cally consistent, and unified philosophy of history and of religion, 
deserves unstinted praise. Although Paul Tillich may not be the 
greatest living Protestant theologian, he is surely one of its 
profoundest thinkers.3 
Theistic Existentialism has been characterized by an emphasis 
upon the crisis experience as man was confronted with the Word of God. 
The crisis situation presents both the dread of despair as well as the 
hope of deliverance. The Existential theologians have posited a reality 
which is God, He being ultimate reality. They have also criticized the 
Atheistic Existentialists for borrowing the Existential principle without 
taking along with it the Christian presuppositions. The Theistic Exis-
tentialists have shown a great interest in speaking to man in his estrang-
ed condition. In the estranged condition man asks himself the question 
concerning his existence. Man's one hope of co~ing to know reality is 
through the experience of anxiety and dread. Anxiety, because reality 
lTillich, ~· ~., p. 165. 
2cochran, loc. cit. 
3~., p. 79. 
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has slipped through his fingers; dread because he has fallen short of 
God's requirement. 
III. EXISTENTIALISM VIEWS MAN 
Atheistic Existentialism 
Human Existence. Heidegger's intention was to develop a general 
ontology. But any universal ontology must be preceded by an existential 
theory of human existence. For Heidegger existence is significant to the 
individual in an absolute way. To exist is to exceed oneself; it is to 
stand outside of oneself and to transcend oneself. It is self-transcen-
dence, never being but always becoming.l 
Existence is not the total man in the all-sidedness of his exis-
tence. It is not all the temporal aspects of man, but only an abstrac-
tion of the latter. The natural aspects of ·,<mumber, space,. motion, and 
life do not belong to existence. Existence rests in itself and is not 
based upon the natural aspects. The natural aspects are in themselves 
meaningless. They depend upon Existence as it alone can give them 
meaning. 2 
All human existence for Heidegger is in essence, existence. That 
is, existence is self-determination, self-projection, or self-transcen-
dence. Existence is to have the potentiality and possibility of Being. 
Man is his potentialities; he constantly chooses one of his potentialities 
and thus projects and actualizes himself in the future. Existence is 
lspier, .2f· ~., p. 28. 
2Ibid., pp. 28-29. 
never identical with itself. It is never static . It is always something 
different than it was. It is always becoming itself, and in becoming him-
self, man is a law unto himself, the creator of his own norm. All exis-
tence is characterized by freedom. It can misuse its freedom by choosing 
against itself. As a result man loses himself and his autonomy; his free 
self-determination changes into heteronomy. As he now bows before norms 
which are foreign to him, norms which he did not make, his existence 
perishes in the world of daily life.l 
Spier characterized Heidegger's Existentialism as, 
in a certain sense it is still humanistie, for it is an irration-
alistic defense of the ideal of personality, and this ideal is one 
of the basic motives of modern humanism. On the other hand, its 
philosophy is a constant nihilism which accepts a disqualified 
pragmatism. Its ideas shift between a pragmatic and nihilistic 
pole, and undoubtedly the accent falls upon the latter. Hei-
degger ends in a dark attitude of nullity which cannot be pene-
trated by the faintest glimmer of hope. 2 
In the last analysis Heidegger's concept is still a humanistic 
philosophy of freedom, but its irrationalisti~ character is displayed 
in the typical Existentialist manner. The Existentialist manner is 
evident in the fact that Heidegger affirms that no one can be redeemed 
from unauthentic Existence by merely accepting his theory. One cannot 
attain the freedom and wisdom of authentic existence by merely believing 
in Heidggger's doctrine. Authentic existence is only reached through the 
existential Angst. To reach the place where the individual is conscious 
of his freedom-toward-death a person must personally experience this 
lspier, .££• .£!!., p. 30. 
2Ibid., p. 37. 
Angst in the very depths of his being. It is possible that a person 
who has never heard of Heidegger's theory may arrive at authentic exis-
tence, and it is equally possible that another person who knows Hei-
degger's theory may never attain to the real wisdom of authentic exis-
tence.1 
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The first principle of Atheistic Existentialism is that man exists. 
Man turns up on the scene and only afterwards does he define himself. 
Jean-Paul Sartre put it like this, 
If man, as the Existentialist conceives him, is indefinable, it 
is because at first he is nothing. Only afterward will he be 
something, and he himself will have made what he will be. Thus, 
there is no human nature, since there is no God to conceive it. 
Not only is man what he conceives himself to be, but he is also 
only what he wills himself to be after this thrust toward exis-
tence. 2 
Sartre went on to state that all Atheistic Existentialists may say 
that man was in anguish. By anguish Sartre meant: the man who involves 
himself and who realizes that he is not only the person he choses to be, 
but also a law-maker who is at the same time, choosing for all mankind 
as well as himself, could not help escape the feeling of his total and 
deep responsibility.3 
The Atheistic Existentialists thought it very distressing that 
God does not exist, because all possibility of finding values in a 
heaven of ideas disappears along with Him. There can be no ~ priori 
1
spier, 12£• ~· 
2Franklin Baumer (ed.), Main Currents of Western Thought (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1952), p. 676.~ 
3Ibid. 
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Good, since there is no infinite and perfect consciousness to think it. 
Nowhere is it written that Good exists, that men must be honest, that 
men must not lie; because the fact is that men are on a plane where 
there are only men. That is the very starting point of Existentialism, 
according to Sartre.1 
Sartre held that everything was permissible of God did not exist 
and as a result man is forlorn, because neither within himself nor with-
out does he find anything to cling to. He can not make excuses for him-
self. 2 
According to Sartre since existence really precedes essence, there 
is no explaining things away by reference to a fixed and given human na-
ture. In Sartre's own words, 
There is no determinism, man is free, man is freedom •••• if God 
does not exist, we find no values or commands to turn to which legi-
timize our conduct. So, in the bright realm of values, we have no 
excuse behind us, nor justification before us. We are alone, with 
no excuses.3 
Sartre's whole idea was that man is condemned to be free. Con-
demned, because he did not create himself, yet, in other respects, free; 
because, once thrown into the world, he is responsible for everything he 
does. The Existentialist discounted the power of passion. He would never 
agree that a sweeping passion was a raging torrent which fatally led a man 
to certain acts and is therefore an excuse. The Existentists hold that 
lBaumer, loc. cit. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid., p. 677. 
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man is responsible for his passion. 1 
r 
Sartre, in SUI!Dlling up the Atheistic Existentialist's view, stated 
that Existentialism is nothing else than an attempt to draw all the con-
sequences of a coherent atheistic position. It was not an effort to 
plunge man into despair at all. Existentialism is not so atheistic 
that even if God does exist, that would change nothing. In his own 
words Sartre said, 
Not that we believe that God exists, but we think that the problem 
of His existence is not the issue. In this sense existentialism is 
optimistic, a doctrine of action, and it is plain dishonesty for 
Christians to make no distinction2between their own despair and ours and then call us despairing. 
In criticism of Sartre, Spier pointed out that Sartre's view is 
characterized by nihilism in his concept of the human spirit, and by 
materialism in his theory of being. Spier noted that Sartre's nihilis-
tic anthropology is the kernel of his system, and that his anthropology 
actually struck a death blow to the heart of Existentialism.3 
Theistic Existentialism 
Karl Barth's concept of man is intricately bound up with his 
concept of God. He said that "the ontological determination of man 
is based upon the fact that in the midst of all other men one of them 
is the man Jesus."4 Barth's ontological definition of man places man 
before his divine counterpart in the person of Christ. "Man is there-
lBaumer, ~· ~· 
2Tuid., p. 679. 
3spier, .£1?.· cit., p. 74. 
4cochran, .£1?.• ~., p. 131. 
fore with God because he is with Jesus, and because Jesus had become 
man's neighbor and brother."1 A comprehensive definition of human 
being for Barth would be that of a being-with-God. 2 
According to Barth, 
Godlessness is not a possibility but-: .the ontological impossibility 
of man's being. Man exists with God, and not without him. Sin is 
a reality. But sin is not a possibility of human being, but its 
ontological impossibility ••• Our being does not include sin; it 
excludes it. A being in sin, being in godlessness, is a being 
contrary to man's being.3 
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Man is able to deny his own being as a being-with-God. But, as the fact 
remains, man is, because God is; or, to state it concretely, "because 
God's being is identical with the being of the man Jes.us. 114 Barth re-
tains this concept of human existence and upon it he rests his doctrine 
of the goodness of man's created being.5 
Human being, according to Barth, "as a being-with-Jesus, is a 
being that rests upon God's election, and consists in a hearing of God's 
Word. 116 Therefore, a human being is a being who is responsible to God. 
, 
The freedom of man is only that freedom of choise which God has granted 
to him. "The freedom which constitutes man's being is not merely man's 
possibility or ability which would first be realized in this use of free-
lcochran, loc. ~· 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid. 
4Ibid. 
5Ibid. 
6~., p. 132. 
dom."l In other words, 
Man is-."-.:precisely in that he decides for God--in that he knows, 
obey'S;-·and calls upon God. Man's very being is his freedom. 
It is a freedom of choice, but, as freedom granted by God, it 
is a freedom in which the right is chos~n. The right is that 
which corresponds to God's free choice. 
Therefore man does not choose between different possibilities, but 
rather he chooses between his only possibility and his impossibility, 
between his being and nonbeing.3 Barth insists that man's freedom is 
not a freedom to sin. For when man sins, he forfeits his freedom. 4 
In spite of the fact that man chooses nonbeing he "is still 
God's creature, and the object of God's grace."5 Sinful man, the one 
who chooses nonbeing, is not the real man. "The sinner who partici-
pates in God's grace is the real man. 116 Barth sees the real man as 
the one who meets man in the person of Christ. 
Barth bases his anthropology upon his Christology. Even though 
Jesus was sinless, and ordinary man sinful, Barth holds that the 
real existence of man is revealed in Jesus. In Jesus man is to~ 
gether with God. To be a true man means then that one is pre-
served by God's mercy, adheres to God's righteousness for Jesusf 
sake. 7 
In his book ~ Christian Doc~rine _2! Creation and Redemption, 
lcochran, loc. cit. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid. 
4Ibid. 
5Nobel v. Sack, "The Eschatology of Some Neo-Supernaturalists" 
(unpublished Doctoral dissertation, Northern Baptist Theological Semin-
ary, Chicago, 1957), pp. 130-131. 
6Ibid. 
7Ibid. 
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Brunner spoke of "the image of God and creation." Brunner's concept 
of the creation of a self came to full expression when he described 
the relationship of the self with the creator. 
The heart of the creaturely existence of :man is freedom, self'hood, 
and to be an "I", a person. Only an "I" can answer a "Thou", only 
a Self which is self-determining can freely answer God. An autom-
aton does respond; an animal, in contradistinction from an autom-
aton, may indeed re-act, but it cannot re-spond. It is not cap-
able of speech, or-free self-determinatIOn, it cannot stand at 
a distance from itself, and it therefore is not ~-sponsible. 1 
However, Brunner is quick to point that ma.n's freedom is only 
that which God has willed to man. God willed man's freedom in order 
that man could answer God and that his answer could be a responsible 
one. 
Responsibility is restricted freedom, which distinguishes human 
from divine freedom; and it is a restriction which is also free--
and this distinguishes our human limited freedom from that OF"'tbe 
rest of creation.2 
According to Brunner the free Self capable of self-determination 
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belongs to the original constitution of man as created by God. But from 
the outset man's freedom is limited.3 
When speaking of the relation of body to spirit, Brunner empha-
sized the biblical doctrine of the wholeness of man. 
The Biblical view leaves no room for the dualistic notion that 
though the "spirit" is of divine origin and divine in character, 
the body on the other hand is something lower and inferior. But 
lEmil Brunner, ~ Christian Doctrine ~ Creation ~ Redemption, 
trans. Olive Wyon {Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1952), II, p. 56. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid. 
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it is less well-known whz the Bible takes this view 0 l 
The relation of body and soul is determined by the divine revela-
tion in the Incarnate Word. The fact that.man bas been made in the image 
of God implies that the body is equally the means of expression and the 
instrument, of the spirit and the will. The body has been given to man 
by the Creator, in order that in it he may express his higher calling and 
make its realization concrete. The body which God has created for man is 
full of the symbolism of his divine-human destiny, and is well suited for 
its realization.2 
For Brunner the spirit is that aspect of human nature by means 
of which man can perceive his divine destiny and, knowing and recog-
nizing this could receive it, and transmit it to the body, as the instru-
ment through which it is accomplished. The spirit receives the Word of 
God, as it is the Spirit of God which speaks to it within the human spir-
it. This is in harmony with the fact that God's Word never comes to man 
as a purely spiritual word, but is always mediated through physcial means 
as a spiritual message, as a word that is spoken with the lips, and that 
the revelation of God takes place through the Incarnation of the Word. 
It is not an abstract spirituality, but in a spirituality of faith, con-
nected with the body, that man received the divine self-revelation. As 
He is the God who wills to reveal Himself through the world, and in the 
world, so He created a creature in His likeness, which by nature is a 
!Brunner, Christian Doctrine £!Creation~ Redem:ption, op. cit. , 
p. 61. 
2Ibid., p. 62. 
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unity of body and soul. The divine love in its self-revelation can only 
be received by the heart of man which is destined to love. 1 
Brunner spoke of "Christian Anthropology in Relation to Natural 
Science." He maintained that modern science is constantly raising two 
significant difficulties for faith. The first is that the mental and 
psychical powers of man are conditioned by the brain, and the second is 
the influence of heredity on the individual.2 
Brunner pointed out one fact which could not be contested. That 
all the ideas and observations and theories which the Self initiates, 
which the thinking Self shapes and alters, estimates logically, verifies, 
corrects, accepts or rejects are products of the Self. Apart from the 
unity of the Self there can be no unity of theory. Without the freedom 
which the Self examines and ponders, in a critical way, the deduction and 
theoretical constructions drawn, there can be _ no progress in science at 
all. And without the strictly scientific ethos, which constrains the man 
of science to subordinate all his personal interests to that of the Truth, 
there can be no scientific progress. Thus Brunner's argument for the unity 
of the Self and freedom of the Self to choose remains valid.3 
Reinhold Niebuhr spoke of the uniqueness of the human self in his 
work on ~ ~ ~ ~ Dramas £! History. He defines the uniqueness of 
the human self by emphasizing the three dialogues in which it is involved 
p. 63. 
lBrunner, Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, ·op. cit., 
2Ibid., p. 81 
3Ibid., p. 85. 
according to the Hebraic rather than the Hellenic description of its 
reality. For Niebuhr the implications of these three dialogues can 
give more accurate content to the original metaphor "image of God" 
than the Greek emphasis on reason. The self for him is a creature 
which is in constant dialogue with itself, with its neighbors, and 
with God.1 
The dialogue of the self with itself is an empiric fact in the 
sense that every person must admit that such a dialogue goes on in the 
internal life of the self, though there is no external evidence of this 
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dialogue. This internal dialogue is a more significant testimony of the 
self's freedom over nature than its endowment with conceptual capacities, 
though these are frequent instrmnents of the self in the dialogue. 2 
The self is in constant dialogue with various neighbors. It is 
not merely dependent upon others for its sustenance and security. It 
depends upon them for the image which it has of itself and for the spir-
itually security which is necessary for the self as its social security.3 
The self is in dialogue with God. The assertion that the self is 
in dialogue with God took the inquiry immediately beyond the limits of 
empirical verification. But Niebuhr made some preliminary concessions 
to the spirit of contemporary empiricism and said merely that the self 
imagined itself in an encounter with the divine. For the persistence of 
lReinhold Niebuhr, The Self and the Dramas .£! History (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955), p.4:--~ 
19 
the imagination is an empirical datum about the self. Niebuhr prefers to 
be moderate and declare that the self distinguishes itself by a yearning 
for the ultimate. He said that if one does not admit this characteristic 
he will have failed to define the total anatomy of human selfhood. 1 
Niebuhr discussed the internal dialogue of the self with itself. 
In his thinking the self maintains a rather constant internal dialogue 
in which it approves or disapproves its actions, or even itself. Its 
accusations and defenses of itself are quite different from those in 
which it engages in its external dialogues. The self pities and glori-
fies itself as well as accuses and excuses itself. It can not carry on 
this dialogue without using its reason; for the dialogue means that the 
self in one of its aspects is making the self, in another of its aspects, 
its object of thought.2 
From Niebuhr's point of view the dialogue within the self pro-
ceeds on many levels. Sometimes it is a dialogue between the self as 
engaged in its various responsibilities and affections and the self in 
the grip of its immediate necessities and biological urges, and the self 
as an organization of long-range purposes and ends. Sometimes the dia-
logue is between the self in the context of one set of loyalties and the 
self in the grip of contrasting claims and responsibilities.3 
Niebuhr concluded his discussion of the self. in a dialogue with 
itself by saying, 
lNiebuhr, .2£· .£!:!:.., p. 5. 
2Ibid., p. 6. 
3~., p. 1. 
The dialogue which the self carries on within itself is certainly 
more complex than understood in classical philosophy. Depth psy-
chology has uncovered many of these complexities. But it has no 
doubt obscurred many others because it failed to gras~ that the 
same self is in the various personae of the dialogue. 
Another area of particiilar interest to Niebuhr was that of the 
self in space and time. His opinion is that there can be no question 
that the self is an object among other objects in space and time. It 
has its dated existence at some particular time and in some. particular 
location. The conditions of time and space, of age and environment 
determine the self's character to a large degree. 2 
But according to Niebhur the self also rose out of the situation 
of time and space. By its memory and foresight it transcends the given 
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moment and. is therefore transtemporal in one dimension of its being. It 
is also spaceless in one dimension. The self-consciousness of the self 
proceeds in a particular organism. But the self is, in one dimension, 
non-spatial. Its imagination is free to rove over the boundaries of 
time and apace to which it is bound. But it is more important to note 
that self-consciousness is ultimately non-spatial.3 
The self and its body was for Niebuhr a particular relationship. 
He held that the self is not a particular self merely because it is in 
a particular body. It can take a partially objective view of its body 
just as it could of its mind. But it has an internal relation to its 
body as to its consciousness which makes the idea of "my body" differ-
lNiebuhr, ££• .£!!., p. 11. 
2~., p. 23. 
3Ibid. 
-
81 
ent from the idea of "my property". There is an organic unity in every 
animal organism which is usually described as its "soul". This self in-
sofar as it has an experience of the unity is "soul". But it is more 
than soul insofar as it can think of its body as an object even while 
it has an inner experience of the bodily organic unity.l 
The self and its search for ultimate meaning was discussed by 
Niebuhr as a threefold response. The first response embraces all reli-
gious responses in which the self seeks to break through a universal 
rational system in order to assert its significance ultimately. 2 
The second alternative of e~licit religious response stands at 
the opposite pole of idolatry. It is in fact an heroic effort totrans-
cend all finite values and systems of meaning, including the self as 
particular existence, and to arrive at universality and "uni:onditioned" 
being.3 
The third alternative, a religious answer to the self's search 
for the ultimate, embraces the two biblical faiths of Judaism and Christ-
ianity. These faiths interpret the self's experience with the ultimate 
in the final reaches of its self-awareness as a dialogue with God. The 
idea of a dialogue between the self and God assumes the personality of 
God, an assumption which both rationalists and mystics find untenable, 
but to which biblical faith clings stubbornly.4 
1Niebuhr, 2£• ~., p . 26. 
2Ibid., p. 63. 
3Ibid., p. 64. 
4Ibid. 
-
Paul Tillich has seen man as existing in a state of finitude. 
He knows not who he is nor where he is going. Man exists in an extran-
ed state from some great unknown thing that is demanded of him. Man 
is filled with wonder at the phenomenon o~ being, simple astonishment 
that things are. This wonder presupposes a darker knowledge that they 
might not be; being is threatened, and will always and everywhere be 
threatened, by non-being. 1 
Tillich is much like Kierkegaard in that he looks upon man's 
existence as a state of anxiety. This Existential anxiety is not"r:;to be 
confused with fear, for it has no object, and fear must have an object. 
Nor was it to be confused with neurotic anxiety; the neurotic attempts 
to avoid non-being by avoiding being.2 
The victim of Existential anxiety may try to sidestep by frantic 
activity, or by worshipping secular concepts, or he may try to bury his 
anxieties in a heteronomous religion that offers him ready ma.de certi-
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tude for his uncertainties. In either case, said Tillich, the individual 
has conmrltted idolatry. Against such idolatry Tillich asserts the Pro-
testant Principle which considers it presumptious of any conditional in-
stitution, such as church or state, to pose as spokesman for the uncon-
ditional, for example, God. According to the Protestant Principle as 
Tillich expounded it, every Yes must be coupled with a eorresponding No, 
and the Protestant Principle does not accept any truth of faith as ultimate 
l"To Be or Not to Be", ~' March 16, 1959, p. 48. 
2Ibid. 
-
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except the one that no man possessesit. 1 
According to Tillich the only way man could cope with his Exis-
tential anxiety is by having the courage to be, which he defines as self-
affirmation in spite of the threatened possibility of non-being. This 
courage to be is like a spark across the gap between existential and 
essential, philosophy and theology, man and God. For this human, self-
affirming courage has its own source and power in the divine self-affirma-
tion. 2 
Man approaches reality through the confirmation of longing and 
frustration, which Tillich calls ultimate concern. Man's hope is the 
New Being, ·a conception Tillich derived from Second Corinthians 5:17.3 
The great questions arising from man's ultimate concern Tillich 
grouped under three headings: Being, Existence, and ~· Man's Being 
was his essential nature, from which he is estranged as Adam was estrang-
ed from Eden. Existence encompasses the situation in which estranged 
man found himself. ~is the combination of Bei!lfi and Existence.4 
Another aspect of Tillich as he viewed the human situation, is 
estrangement, suffering, and bondage. By estrangement Tillich meant 
that man is shut within himself and cut off from participation. At the 
same time, man falls under the power of objects which tend to make him 
a mere object without a self. If subjectivity separcrl:ai itself from ob-
I.rime, loc. cit. 
2ibid. 
~
3Ibid. 
~
jectivity, the objects swallow the empty shell of subjectivity. 1 
By suf'fering Tillich pointed out that in Christianity the demand 
is made to accept suf'fering as an element in finitude with the ultimate 
courage and thereby to overcome that suf'fering which depends on Exis-
tential estrangement, which is destruction. Christianity knows that 
such a victory ·over destructive suf'fering is only partly possible in 
time and space.2 
By bondage Tillich stated that in every act of Existential self-
realization, freedom and destiny are united. Existence is always both 
fact and act. From this it follows that no act within the context of 
existential estrangement can overcome existential estrangement. Des-
tiny keeps freedom in bondage without eliminating it.3 
. Summa?::Y• Theistic Existentialism sees man as he stands in rela-
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tion to God in an estranged condition. Human being was created good and 
man was given the possibility for choice between being and nonbeing. The 
human self has a body which serves as a symbol of the relationship in which 
the incarnate Word came as the God-man. Man as a self is capable of free 
action and communication with himself, others, and God. It is his chief 
duty to choose that which God has planned for him. Man must choose be-
tween being and nonbeing. In the midst of this choice there is the fru-
stration of dread and anxiety. For man to choose other than h~s real be-
lpaul Tillich, Systematic Theology (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1957), II, p. 65. 
2Ibid., p. 70. 
3Ibid., p. 78. 
ing is to sin and fall into idolatry. To sin is to choose nonbeing. 
IV THE ETHICAL IMPLICATION OF EXISTENTIALISM'S VIEW OF MAN 
Introduction 
The Existential principle of existence before essence has prac-
tically eliminated a systematic discussion of Existentialism's ethics. 
The only reliable value in Existentialism is that of decision in the 
midst of anguish and anxiety. Carl Henry gives some reasons why Exis-
tentialism is difficult to systematize. "The Existentialist scorns 
every endeavor to define moral and spiritual claims by rational cri-
teria. "1 Traditional ethical studies, with their systematic approach 
is a speculative luxury for the Existentialist. They represent as 
evasion of life itself via abstraction. "Systematic ethics appears 
to the Existentialist as grotesquely irrelevant to the stark realities 
of daily problems and pressures. 112 
Existentialism is hostile to any attempt to discover universal 
essences or principles; ; ~t insists that to understand the values and 
moral questions is to misunderstand them. The effort to formulate a 
principle as a test of the rightness or wrongness of arry ethical de-
cision is to obscure the essential nature of ethical living. The ethi-
cal life for the Existentialist is a life of existential decision and 
not a life of rational synthesis.3 
1carl F. H. Henry, Christian Persona1· Ethics (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1957), p. 120. 
2Ibid. 
3~. 
Existentialism scorns the attempt to formulate a world-and-life 
view. Any claim to a rational understanding of existence is thrust 
aside as pretense. Thus the entire moral tradition of the West is re-
pudiated as speculative rationalism. 1 
In Henry's evaluation existential C'"lnoralists have proposed a 
"practical" morality rather than speculative rational systems. The 
Existentialist asks, 
What shall I do in this concrete predicament in view of its 
specific alternatives? and, not What is the nature of duty? 
or, What is the nature of the self that it should be required 
to do anything at all?2 
For the Existentialist, disintegrating and frustrating experiences of 
life serve constantly to alert one to the awareness that human life is 
intense subjective decision. "The Existentialist pleas for a passion-
ate life-or-death approach to ethics."3 The ethical man comes into 
being through moral commitments. In decision man makes his own to-
morrow in a context of existence which is neither bound by necessity 
nor hemmed in by reason. The Existentialist sees the problems of life 
as psychological and not logical. Therefore ethical decision should be 
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ventured on the existential-practical level, rather from the theoretical 
point of view. 4 
lHenry, ~· cit., p. 123. 
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Atheistic Existential Ethics 
Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre are the leading exponents 
of A theistic Existentialism. Both have rejected the rational approach 
to life as invalid. Hedonism is condemned as unjustifiable by Heidegger 
and Sartre; The tragic side of life is to serve an introduction to the 
various possible ethical decisions. By passionate living man can, in a 
world wherein he is a homeless vagrant, be free to create his own values, 
and thus make himself a moral individual. 1 
According to Norman N. Greene, Sartre's description of human 
reality (nature) is best sunnned up by the statement that, 
Man is a free being, in that bright realm of values, we have no 
excuse behind us, nor justification before us. No excuse behind 2 us, because only our own free choice can account for eur actions. 
It was Greene's opinion that Sartre's ethics was the obligatory pursuit 
of chosen ends, accompanied by a constant awareness that they are freely 
chosen and that a new choice is possible. It requires both action and 
uncertainty, activity and reflection, modes of life which have often 
been held to be incompatible.3 
Atheistic Existentialists have regarded the tragic dimension of 
man's experience as a silent acknowledgment that man is separated, not 
from God, but from his real self. Man's sense of the tragic is forced 
on him from the inside, not from the outside. This sense of anguish 
arises because man is conscious':..ef his experience and other creatures 
1i!enry, ~· _ill., p. 125. 
2Norman N. Greene, Jean-Paul Sartre: ~Existential Ethics 
(Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, i960), PPo 45-46. 
3Ibid. 
merely undergo theirs. For man to affirm his ident~ty with the distraught 
self is to acknowledge himself a failure, and to deny the ambiguity of the 
self. The alternative option is a dynamic "conversion" which, accepting 
this ambiguity, strives to actualize the transcendent self •. l
For the Atheistic Existentialist the absence of values means 
man's freedom is unthwarted. Death is the only sure thing in man's ex-
perience. Therefore, man must make his decisions and act under the 
threat of death. Life gains its entire significance from the present 
act alone.2 
Man's decision becomes absolute in significance in that he is 
the god who shapes his own destiny. Man's will alone can act determina-
tively in the free historical order~3 
In criticism of the Atheistic Existential view of ethics, Henry 
pointed out that the cardinal "evil" for them is human existence at 
half-mast. This "evil", if taken seriously would seem to require a 
rejection of the existential approach to life. For existence is not 
as free and determined as the Existentialist would have people to be-
lieve. The fact that the Existentialist admits death as the last ex-
perience would seem to inhibit freedom. Since man can not will his 
existence there is little evidence which would say he can will the 
reality of values. Man can hardly be ethically creative when personal 
lHenry, loc. cit. 
2Thid~, p. 126. 
3nid. 
-
extinction is the surest of his encounters with reality. Since all is 
in the flux of change -~man's decisions too are bounded by meaninglessness 
and indifference of the time-space process. 1 
According to Henry the Existentialist has become a victim of his 
own rejection of a providential order of fixed moral purposes and ra-
tional ultimates. The Existentialist's argument that values and the 
risk of total loss requires that nothing be decided beforehand becomes 
unconvincing in the light of experience. If man creates the distinction 
between right and wrong, and subjectivity supplies the content, the 
absolute significance of the existential decision discloses itself aa~ 
merely psychological deception. 2 
Another point of difficulty in Atheistic Existentialism for 
Henry was the notion that man is without light in the darkness of his 
moral predicament. To say that man is to will his freedom is to imply 
no concrete content to ethical action. No objective content can be 
attached to the moral act. The existential formula is that man ought 
to choose; what he choose is a matter of indifference) 
In summary of Atheistic Existentialism it can be stated that man 
is the creator of his own values and his own world of reality. The tra-
gedies of the human situation are merely a separation of man from his real 
self. Life gains value and significance only through the decision of the 
crisis experience. Man's decision becomes absolute in that he becomes his 
lHe~~ loc. cit. 
2Ibid~, p. 127. 
3Ibid. 
-
own god and shapes his own destiny. 
Theistic Existential Ethics 
Karl Barth has written little directly in the field of ethics, 
however, the ethical implications of his thought can be found in his 
Doctrine of the~ pf, God and other works. Barth's claim bas been 
that he is setting forth church doctrine. In the opinion of Thomas 
Hill, Barth "challenges philosophy with a position the acceptance of 
which would supersede virtually all independent philos9phies. 111 
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Barth opposes any kind of intellectual investigation in isolation 
from life, which proposes to find ultimate truth. He has a distrust for 
conscience whether religious or otherwise. Truth can exist only in the 
existential moment when God speaks to man. When he applies this concept 
to ethics Barth shows that man is incapable of apprehending ethical truth 
pr of fulfilling its requirements. Also he shows that both ethical truth 
and ethical achievements are wholly dependent upon God's speaking to man. 
Both of these emphases are reflected in Barth's statement concerning a 
proposed treatment of ethics in the foreward to his Doctrine of ~ ~ 
of God where he writes: 
Ethics so-called I regard as the doctrine of God's command and do 
not consider it right to treat it otherwise than as an integral 
part of d~gmatics, or to produce a dogmatics which does not in-
clude it. 
Barth attacks ethical relativism and shows the complete inability 
1Thomas ·Hill1 Conte~orary Ethical Theories (New York: The Mac-
millan Company, 1957), p. • 
2Karl Barth, The Doctrine of the Word of God, trans. G. T. Thomson 
(New York: Charles Scribner's Son'S; i936);-p.--XiV:-
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of man to discover moral truth or to fulfil moral requirements. 'ire holds 
that in the light of the fact of God, the complete realitivity of all hu-
man knowledge is manifested." 1 Man adopts 
Ideas and principles, points of view scientific, ethical and 
aesthetic, exioms, self-evident truths, soci~l and political, 
certainties, conservative and revolutionary. 
These become gods and universities are their temples; but "to recognize 
the one and only God means to make all these systems relative." !'When 
the knowledge of God becomes manifest, they no longer possess ultimate 
credibility. 11 3 According to Barth ethics have no validity save for 
persons in particular times and places. Therefore any objective test 
for ethics cannot but lie beyond the world of space and time: "Our 
demonstrated existence in this world is measured upon a standard which 
is not al all a part of existence as we know it or conceive it. 114 Ac-
cording to Barth the relativism of all our codes and all our interpreta-
tions is becoming generally evident in the modern revolt against "authority 
for its own sake. 11 5 
Hill evaluated Barth as contending that moral insight and achieve-
ment are, in the moral sphere, completely dependent upon the sovereign 
and free revelation of God, that is, upon the Word of God. According to 
ln111, op. cit., p. 99. 
2Karl Barth, The Knowledge of God ~ the Service of God, trans. 
J~ L. ·M. Haire and Ian Henderson (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939), 
p. 18. 
3Ibid., pp. 18, 19. 
4Karl Barth, "The Problems of Ethics Today" in The Word of God and 
the Word of Man, trans. Douglas Horton (London: Hodder&Stoughton:l928J, 
P.138.- -_ -
5Ibid., pp. 292, 293. 
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Barth this revelation comes to man from a God who is Himself completely 
other than man and so altogether incomprehensible to man. God is a holy 
God and it is presumptuous to try to encompass Him in any kind of formula. 
Man's insight never penetrates beyond God's revelation or even fully grasps 
that revelation itself. In Barth's concept, man's ultimate meaning of 
right and good is the sovereign incomprehensible approval of God. 1 
The Barthian concept of the Word of God is that the Word of God 
never becomes an object. It must be repeated if it is again to be valid. 
"What God utters is never in any way known and true in abstraction of 
God Himself."2 This Word of God is manifested in three forms: preaching, 
Scripture, and revelation itself. The Word of God can never be structured 
into a code or system or displayed in scriptual quotations.3 It is always 
personal, living, and purposive. It is, and remains God's mystery, yield-
ing no remaining content that can itself be called "the Word of God. 114 
The dawning of the Word of God upon man is the other side of his 
despair. At the time when man sees his struggle to be impossible, Ligh.t 
from God breaks in.5 The content of that which God approves does not seem 
to be particular acts, but a certain type of existence. God does not de-
mand of man this or that according to some rule. Norabes He prescribe ~ 
the details of our duty. Rather He commands man to choose his way in the 
lHill, 2E.• cit., p. 101. 
2Barth, "The Problems of Ethics Today," !?£• cit., p. 155. 
3Ibid~, p. 159. 
4Ibid.' p. 184. 
-- . 
~arth, The Word of God ~ ~ ~ of Man, op. cit., p. 67. 
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light of the new and approved kind of existence. As Barth writes: 
Without being disturbed by the inconsistent appearance of it we 
shall then enjoy the freedom of saying now Yes and now No, and 
of saying both, not as the result of outward chance or of inward 
caprice, but because we are so moved by the will of God, which 
has been abundantly proved "goal, and acceptable, and perfect" 
{Rom. 12: 2) .1 
The moral theory implied in the statements of Barth become expli-
cit and orderly in the thought of Emil Brunner. Like Barth, Brunner 
adopts from the outset an avowedly Christian standpoint, refusing to 
be led outside this approach. 2 As Brunner writies of the Christian: 
There he stands--as one who has been touched by God, whose heart 
has been pierced by Him, as one who has come under the stern judg-
ment of God and has tasted the Divine mercy, as one who can never 
seek the meaning of his life and the answer to that great human 
question anywhere else save there!3 
The Good, which for Brunner, stands for all the moral predicates, 
is never something intrinsic. Ethics is the dependent child, not the 
parent or the ind~pendent partner of theology. Christianity has always 
regraded even the Law of Nature as the command of God.4 As Brunner puts 
it: 
Here there is no "intrinsic" Good. What God does and wills is good; 
and all that opposes the will of God is bad. The Good has its ·basis 
and its existence solely in the will of God. • • '511e will of God only 
is Good and it is to be done because He wills it. 
1narth, The Word .£! God and the Word .£!Man, op. cit., p. 180. 
2Hill, ~· ~., p. 102. 
3Brunner, The Divine Imperative, op. cit., p. 9. 
. --
4Emil Brunner, Justice and the Social Order, trans. Mary Hottinger 
(New York: Harper .& Brothers, 1945),p. 85. --
5Brunner, The Divine Imperative, op. cit., p. 53. 
For Brunner the will of God is not something that can be appre-
hended by human powers and objectified in human thought forms. Thus 
the good is never a universal principle or a general truth: 
The universal validity and universal intelligibility or rationality 
of its principle. • • must be absolutely rejected by the Christian 
ethic. The scientific presentation of the Christian ethic can cer-
tainly· never represent the Good as a general truth, easy to be per-
ceived, and based on a universal principle.I 
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The good is likewise never obedience to a fixed and formal law. Instead 
the good is revealed in the moment of God's speaking to an individual, and 
there alone. 2 As Brunner put it: 
There is no Good save obedient behaviour, save the obedient will. 
But this obedience is rendered not to law or to principle which 
can be known beforehand, but only to the free, sovereign will of 
God. The Good consists of always doing what God wills at any 
particular moment.3 
Reinhold Niebuhr insists upon a thoroughgoing relativity of all 
human ethical insight and activity. The relativity of man's ethics is 
rooted in the very structure of human nature according to Niebuhr's con-
cept. Niebuhr criticized Rationalism and Romanticism for their "lack of 
a principle of interpretation which can do justice to both the height of 
human self-transcendence and the organic unity between the spirit of man 
and his physical life. 114 According to Niebuhr man is thoroughly rooted 
in this finite world, but on every side his nature reaches out toward in-
1Brunner, The Divine Imperative, op. cit., p. 89. 
2Hill, .9£· cit., p. lo4. 
3Brunner, The Divine Imperative, op. cit., p. 83. 
4Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of' Man (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955), p. 123. 
finity so that "the limits of self lie finally outside the self. 111 
Niebuhr holds that individual relationships, being based on 
common presuppositions and rooted in personal ties, are less biased 
than group judgments. However, "these advantages are in terms of de-
gree and not in kind. 112 Even the common standards are "qualified by 
the particular perpspectives of different families, classes, cultural 
groups, and social functions. 11 3 We always judge ourselves by our own 
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standards and weigh ourselves in balances which give us a special advant-
4 age. :1 
The very essence of sin, according to Niebuhr, is man's effort to 
exalt his relative ideas into absolutes or to pretend that he is Godo His 
interpretation of Christian doctrine is "that sin has its source not in 
temporality but in man's willf'ul ref'usal to acknowledge the finite and 
determinate character of his existence."5 Moral effort itself is tainted. 
Thus the moral urge to establish order in life is mixed with the 
ambition to make oneself the center of that order; and devotion to 
every transcendent value is corrupted ~Y the effort to insert the 
interests of the self into that value. -
Nor does effort to elevate moral ideals help for: "The higher the aspira-
lNiebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, op. cit., p. 156. 
2Reinhold Niebuhr, An Interpretation of Christian · Ethics {New York: 
Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1935), p.126. ~ 
3Ibid., p. l25. 
4Ibid. 
5Niebuhr, The Nature ~Destiny of Man, op. cit., p. 177. 
~iebuhr, An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, op. cit., p. 85. 
tions rise the more do sinful pretensions accompnay them. 111 Such pre-
tensions tend only to intensify confusion. For example the troubled 
international situation is not only a picture of human finitude, it is 
also a "tragic revelation of the consequences of sinful dishonesty which 
accompany every effort to transend it. 112 
Niebuhr holds that Christian ethics depend upon revelations. These 
revelations are of two sorts: private or. general revelations, and public 
or specific revelations in history. General revelation is the basis for 
the acceptance of special revelation, but only through special revelation 
does general revelation become meaningful. Only through it does man learn 
that it~is God who gives direction and force to conscience.3 Through the 
special revelation of the Bible 
a universal human experience, the sense of being commanded, placed 
.under obligation and~judged, is interpreted as a relation be~reen 
God and man in which it is God who makes the demands and judgments 
upon man.4 
It is also Niebuhr's thought that without this interpretation of con-
science through historical revelation, "conscience becomes falsified, 
because it is explained merely as man facing the court of social approval 
or disapproval or as facing his own best self. 11 5 
Niebuhr suggests that the significance of morality is found in the 
lNiebuhr, ~ Interpretation _2! Christian Ethics, loc. cit. 
2 Ibid., p. 130. 
3Hill, .£e• cit., p. lo8. 
4Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny£!~, op. cit., p. 129. 
5Ibid., p. 130. 
concept of "vicarious suffering love" as examplified in Jesus. He 
justifies this love in terms of the will of God and its demands upon 
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us in terms of the revelation of God's will. The content of morality 
or its practical standard my be spoken of in terms of love which demands 
both disinteres~ed equality and postitive benevolence. 1 Its specific 
demands cannot, however, be set forth in advance; nor is there ever~ ,. 
ground for hope that they may be completely fulfilled. In practice 
one must attempt to apply the ideal as fully and as realistically as 
possible, all the while recognizing that his efforts fall far short. 
In this process the acknowledgment of sin and redemption are essential. 
One only begins to escape the partiality that mars man's judgments when 
he recognizes his own sin and God's forgiveness. "Only a forgiving love, 
grounded in repentance is adequate for healing the animosities between 
nations."2 
Paul Tillich has not written directly in the field of ethics, 
but his ethical concepts are apparent in his various works. The crux 
of his ethics is the imperative for man to be himself. Man is con-
fronted with various choices as to what he will be and this causes 
anxiety. Man may try to a~oid this anxiety by worshipping secular 
concepts such as success or nationalism.3 Or he may try to avoid 
anxiety by turning to religions which offer him ready make certitudes 
for his uncertainities. In either case, once ma~ has committed himself, 
lNiebuhr, The Nature and Destiny 2!:_ ~, op. cit., p. 107. 
2Niebuhr, An Interpretation 2!:_ Christian Ethics, op. cit., p. 128. 
3Time, ££• ~., p. 48. 
he has committed idolatry.l 
·This idolatry is the outgrowth of man's basic sin, that of not 
being man. Tillich holds that the myth of Adam and Eve explains the 
universal sin of man, in that man wants to be God rather than man. With 
this urge to be something other than himself, man shuts himself off from 
God and other men. Man is in a state of estrangement? Tillich said, 
In the state of estrangement man isSiut within himself and cut 
off from participation. At the same time, he falls under the 
power of objects which tend to make him~into a mere object with-
out a self. If subjectifity separates itself from objectivity, 
the objects swallow the empty shell of subjectivity.3 
For Tillich man is immoral when he chooses to pe something other 
than himself. Man becomes subject to the material and secular when he 
chooses to be other than himself. The moral man lives in a state of 
existential anxiety, in which he is always confronted with the decision 
of choose between being (himself), and non-being (something other than 
himself). 
Summary. Theistic Existential ethics reconstructs the traditional 
Christian concept of ethics into a relative system of ethics. The basis 
upon which Theistic Existential ethics is built is found in the existen-
tial moment when God speaks to man in revelation. Revelation is not some-
thing fixed or static, but something on-going, something living. With re-
ference to a written revelation Theistic Existentialists bold that the 
Bible contains only in concept the Word of God and that the concepts be-
lTime, ~· cit., p. 48. 
2Ibid. 
3Tillich, System&uic Theology, op . cit., II, p. 65. 
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c~me revelation only when God chooses to reveal them to man. This revela-
tion occurs in existential anxiety or as Barth put it, in dialectial con-
frontation. 
The absence of an objective standard poses no problems for the 
Theistic Existentialists, for man lives in the true sense of living 
when he is in the midst of anxiety and anguish. William Sha~espeare's 
lines from Ha.inlet give expression to the situation in which man finds 
himself, "to be, or not to be: that is the question."1 
1wi lliam Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act III, Scene I, Line 56. 
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CHAPTER IV 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
I. SUMMARY 
Introduction 
It was the problem of this study to survey some contemporary 
Idealistic and Existential philosophies of man and their ethical impli-
cations. In order to solve this problem it was necessary to investigate 
their views of the nature of ultimate reality, the nature of being, and 
the nature of man. 
After much reading and research the writer of this thesis has 
made the following observations about some contemporary philosophies 
of man. 
Man in Idealistic Philosophy 
Absolute Idealism. The leading exponents of this school of 
thought were Josiah Royce and William Ernest Hocking. They conceived 
man as a self. This human self's character and quality were derived 
from its social relationships and experiences. Man has the capacity to 
choose, hold to an absolute standard, and can determine2his own life and 
course of action. The human self and the body are one ; for the two to-
gether equal a full self. The body is a means of communication between 
selves and therefore becomes an expression of the self to which it belongs. 
The fact that the human self is self-conscious gives evidence to the theo-
ry that it is an expression of the Absolute Self which is immanent in na-
\ 
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ture and all of life. 
Since man is capable of determining his own course of action, 
Absolute Idealism has conceived man as being a rational creature with 
the capacity to adhere to an absolute standard. Ethical living is that 
way of life which adheres to an objective standard of truth and right. 
Ethical living for Royce was loyalty to loyalty. 
Personalism • . The leading exponents of this school of thought 
were Borden Parker Bowne and Edgar Sheffield Brightman. They conceived 
man as a functional unity of body and mind. Man is the product of his 
experiences. He is capable of intercommunicationld.th other persons and 
with the Supreme Person who willed him into existence. Man is a com-
plex unity of conscious actions and interactions with his environment, 
his body, and the Supreme Person. 
Personalism holds that man is capable of moral action. The 
primary moralssand ideals of Personalism are the good, duty, and vir-
tue. Moral action is possible only under rational action. Experience 
is the basis of ethics when experience is conceived as rational as well 
as empirical. To act less than rational, or irrational,. is immoral for 
the Personalists. 
Man ~ Existential Philosophy 
Atheistic Existentialism. The leading exponents of this school 
of thought have been Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre. Their con-
cept of man is characterized by the absence of a rational account of the 
nature or content of the human self. Rather their main attention was 
directed to a description of the human condition. Yet in their descrip-
tion of human existence Heidegger and Sartre retained an idealistic 
concept of man. Hence their philesophy has been labeled humanistic 
as well as atheistic. Man appears on the seene and only after his 
appearance does he describe himself. Thus existence always precedes 
essence. Therefore there can be no static human nature nor descrip-
tion of human nature which is always valid for all in the flux of 
change. 
In ethics Atheistic Existentialists hold that the absence 
of set or static values makes man free. Death is the only sure thing 
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in man's experience and all of life is ~lived under this threat. Man's 
decision in the midst of anguish and anxiety becomes absolu~e in signi-
ficance in that man himself is the god~ who shapes his own destiny. Thus 
man creates his own values and his own world of reality. 
Theistic Existentialism. The leading exponents of this philosophy 
were Karl Barth, Emil Brunner, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Paul Tillich. These 
men see man as he stands in relation to God in an estranged condition. 
Man was originally created good but when given the possibility to choose 
between being and nonbeing, he chose the latter . Man has a body which 
serves as a symbol of the relationship which the incarnate Word came as 
the God-man. Man's chief duty is to choose that which God has planned 
for him. Man must choose between being and nonbeing. In the midst of 
the two possibilities man experiences frustration and anxiety. 
In ethics man is confronted with the Word of God and given the 
freedom to either say yes or no to the Word. To say yes is to side with 
God and to say no is to fall short of God's plan. However, the content 
of this Word of God is subjective rather than objective and therefore 
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leads to a relative rather than absolute standard of truth or right. 
The greatest sin would be the refusal tor man to realize his real self 
as being-with-God. Anything short of this is idolatry. 
II. CORCLUSIOBS 
Absolute Idealism holds a lofty view of man and makes ethics merely a mat-
ter of loyalty to an objective standard of moral principles. It tends to 
ignore or treat lightly moral evil and its relationship to the nature of 
man. 
Personalism sees man as determining his character by conscious choice 
and ethics are based upon moral laws. Even though it holds a high view 
of man it falsely assumes that man will always act rationally or coher-
ently. The empirical evidence proves otherwise. Man acts irrationally' 
and emotionally as well as rationally'. 
Atheistic Existentialism views man as he appears on the scene of time and 
says that man alone is qualified to construct his world of values. This 
type of Existentialism tends to ignore the rational aspects of human exis-
tence. Although it disclaims an idealistic concept of man, it has retained 
a humanistic view of man. Man creates his own work, god, and moral criteria. 
Theistic Existentialism conceives man as a sinner in revolt against his 
Creator. Though in revolt man still retains the rational and emotional 
nature given to him by God's creative act. Ethics are based upon a rela-
tivity which demands the individual to choose right conduct when confronted 
with "revelation". This view of man is in keeping with the Reformed Doc-
trine of Man but its ethical concepts are too dependent upon subjective 
decision. 
\ 
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APPENDIX A. 
Hocking's Sunnnary of Objective (Absolute) Idealism 
(1) There are two main kinds of order ±h2the world, an order of classes 
(for things existing at the same time) and an order of events. The or-
der of classes runs up to a unity chiefly because the mind works that 
way: it classifies its classes into higher classes, until it reaches 
the all-inclusive class, "being". This leaves open the question wheth-
er there is or is not an inclusive unity in the objects themselves. 
(2) Of the events in time-sequence, there are two orders, a causal or-
der and a purposive order. The fact that the causal order applies to 
all events, on the principle that every event has a cause, can not 
exclude the actual existence of a purposive order, of which we are 
aware in ourselves, nor the possibility of a corresponding principle 
t~at every event has a purpose. 
(3) These two orders are not independent; they constitute, not a 
dualism, but a single system of events. 
(4) The purposive system can explain and include the cause system. 
The causal system cannot explain nor include the purposive system. 
Thus the purposive system must be the beginning of an explanation 
of the world. The physical must be understood from the mental, not 
the mental from the physical. 
(5) This means that the event-structure of the world has its unity 
in purpose. And this purpose must be one and not many. The single-
ness of the causal order implies a corresponding singleness of the 
purposive order. 
(6) The single purpose corresponds with the unity of the order of 
classes. The unity of purpose is the unity of being. This is the 
result which, in religious terms, is cailed the existence of God, 
as the one real from which all other things are derived. 
(7) This proposition implies the following propositio.ns: (a) the 
world has a meaning; (b) nothing in the world is meaningless, not 
even wastes and its evils; (c) the existence of mankind has a mean-
. ing; (d) the existence of individual men has a meaning. 
(8) Proposition 6 does not imply: (a) that the world has, or has not 
a beginning in time; (b) that nothing is added to the world since the 
original deposit or creation of the physical order; (c) that there is 
no other space-time order than the one present to scientific inquiry; 
(d) that the human self is destroyed with the death of the body. 
(9) In bringing forth man, the universe has brought forth a mind 
which is free and creative. Its freedom implies its power to de-
termine the future from conceived alternatives; also its power to 
err, to reject duty, and to injure. Its creatiY-ity implies its 
capacity to add to creation and to cooperate with the original pur-
pose in the finishing of the world. 
(10) If man can cooperate with God, man must be able to grasp in 
substance, though not in plan, the nature of God's purpose: good-
ness and right must be the same for man and God, not different; 
truth must be the same; beauty must be the same. This is what is 
meant by the proposition, found in Buddhism, in Vedanta, in Stoic-
ism, in Christianity, and other religions, that man "shares in the 
nature of Goo." 
(11) This constitutes the dignity of human nature and, at the same 
time, the obligation of the human being. Life is an occasion in 
which obligation, opportunity, and happiness normally coincide. 
( 12) Life is also an occasion in which the fulfillment of one's 
task is likely to be attended with suffering. But the suffering 
which is a consequence of the agressive fulfillment of duty is 
significant suffering and loses that sting of pure accident or 
pure loss. And in it there need not be defeat; but rather1the assured fulfillment of the deepest ·will of the individual. 
lWilliam Ernest Hocking and others, Preface to Philosophy 
(New York: The Macmillan Crnnpany, 1947), pp. 503-5oli:' 
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APPENDIX B. 
Brightman 1 s System of Moral Laws 
I. The Formal Laws. 
1. The Logical Law is stated as follows: All persons ought to will 
logically; i.e., each person ought to will to be free from self-
contradiction and to be consistent in his intentions. A moral 
person does not both will and not will the same ends; this pro-
perty of a moral person is called his formal rightness. 
2. The Law of Antonomy: All persons ought to recognize themselves 
as obligated to choose in accordance with the ideals which they 
acknowledge. Or: ·self-imposed ideals are imperative. 
II. The Axiological Laws. 
3. ·The Axiological Law: All persons ought to choose values which 
are self-consistent, harmonious, and coherent, not values which 
are contradictory or incoherent with one another. 
4. The Law of Consequences: All persons ought to consider and, on 
the whole, approve the foreseeable consequences of each of their 
choices. 
5. The Law of the Best Possible: All persons ought to will the best 
possible values in every situation; hence, if possible, to approve 
every situation. 
6. The Law of Specification: All persons ought, in any given situa-
tion, to deve lop the value or values specifically relevant to that 
situation. 
7. The Law of the Most Inclusive End: All persons ought to choose a 
coherent life in which the widest possible range of value is real-
ized. · 
8. The Law of Ideal Control: All persons ought to control their em-
pirical values by ideal values. 
III. The Personalistic Laws. 
9. The Law of Individualism: Each person ought to realize in his own 
experience the maximum value of which he is capable in harmony with 
moral law. 
10. The Law of Altruism: Each Person ought to respect all other persons 
as ends in themselves, and, as far as possible, to cooperate with 
others in the production and enjoyment of shared values. 
11. The Law of the Ideal Personality: All persons ought to judge and 
guide all of their acts by their ideal conception (in harmony with 
the other Laws) of what thi whole personality ought to become both 
individually and socially. 
1:srightman, Moral Laws, op. cit., pp. 98, lo6, 125, 142, 156, 171, 183, 
194, 2o4, 223, 242. ~ 
